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Foreign Direct Investment in the
Canada:
and
States
United
Fractured Neoliberalism and the
Regulatory Imperative
Gil Lan*

ABSTRACT

Although both Canada and the United States review
foreign investment for national security concerns, Canada also
requires that the investment be of "net benefit" to Canada.
Recent investments by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have prompted the suggestion
that the United States should also adopt a net benefit or
economic test. This Article argues that the United States should
not adopt the Canadian approach. The Canadian approach
attempts to screen out foreign public entities and requires that
they act in a "commercial"manner. This approach is based on
two assumptions. First, it assumes that one can segregate the
public foreign interest from private and domestic interests.
Second, it assumes that one can adequately define what it
means to act in a commercial manner. This Article contends
that both assumptions are incorrect due to their dependence
upon classical categories such as public/private and
domestic/foreign that are of limited value in a postmodern,
globalized economy. This Article argues that an approach based
on addressingspecific harms, regardless of identity of the actor,
represents a more sustainable approach towards the risks
associated with foreign government-controlled entities. This
Article suggests that competition law, through its policy-based
regulationof harms by economic entities, can form the basis of a
new regulatory structure to address concerns, which in
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retrospect, are about aggregationsof power rather than strictly
nationalidentity.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Controversy arose last year over the $15.1 billion acquisition of
Nexen Inc. (a Canadian oil and gas corporation) by a Chinese stateowned enterprise (China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC)).
The proposed transaction was reviewed by both the U.S. 1 and
1.

See Carolyn King, Cnooc Purchaseof Nexen Is Approved by U.S., WALL ST.

J. (Feb. 12, 2013, 9:54 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873241
96204578299862176958542 [http://perma.ccME3C-JQCN] (archived Sept. 14, 2014)
("The approval by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., which Nexen
announced Tuesday, came after the companies agreed to resubmit their application.
CFIUS is a multiagency group in Washington that vets significant foreign investment
in the US."); see also Roberta Rampton & Scott Haggett, CNOOC-Nexen Deal Wins U.S.
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Canadian governments. 2 The transaction was notable for at least two
important reasons. First, the transaction represented the largest
foreign direct investment (FDI) by China to date. 3 Second, the
transaction raised national security concerns in both Canada and the
United States. In Canada, the immense size of the transaction
involving Canada's resources was a source of controversy for those
apprehensive about such a significant investment from China, a
4
country that still adheres, at least formally, to socialist ideology. The
transaction also fell within the purview of the American government's
scrutiny because some of Nexen's assets were located within the
6
United States, 5 which raised concerns about China and its motives.
Although ultimately approved by both governments, the Nexen
acquisition once again brought into focus the worry that foreign
government-controlled entities, such as state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), could detrimentally affect
domestic interests.

Approval, Its Last Hurdle, REUTERS CANADA (Feb. 12, 2013, 5:30 PM),
http://ca.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idCABRE91BOSU20130212?pageNumber=1
&virtualBrandChannel=0 fhttp://perma.cc/J95L-ZA54] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) ("U.S.
regulators have approved the $15.1 billion takeover of Canadian oil and gas company
Nexen Inc by China's state-owned CNOOC Ltd, removing the final obstacle to the
Asian country's largest-ever foreign takeover.").
See Laura Payton, Government OK's Foreign Bids for Nexen, Progress
2.
Energy, CBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2012, 11:32 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/
[http://perma.cc/
government-ok-s-foreign-bids-for-nexen-progress-energy- 1.1148156
DU58-L2SQ] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) ("The federal government has approved two
major energy takeover deals, green-lighting a $15.1 billion bid for Nexen Inc. by a
Chinese state oil company . . .. Investors have been waiting since July for a decision on
the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) bid for Calgary-based Nexen.");
see also Lauren Krugel, Nexen CNOOC Takeover Complete: $15.1-Billion Deal Closes,
HUFFPOST ALBERTA (Feb. 25, 2013, 5:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/
[http://perma.cclM6B8-TJHA]
02/25/nexen-cnooc-takeover-completen_2761580.html
(archived Sept. 14, 2014) ("Chinese state-owned firm CNOOC Ltd. is now officially in
control of Calgary oil and gas producer Nexen Inc.").
See Krugel, supra note 2 ("CNOOC's $15.1 billion takeover of Nexen, first
3.
announced last July, was completed on Monday, marking China's largest-ever
successful overseas acquisition.").
See id. ("The CNOOC-Nexen deal touched off a great deal of controversy
4.
about what degree foreign state-owned control of Canadian resources is acceptable.
That the deal came from a Chinese company, in particular, raised concerns in some
quarters about doing business with a non-democratic state.").
King, supra note 1 ("The acquisition was subject to U.S. and British
5.
approval because Nexen controls significant assets in the Gulf of Mexico and the North
Sea.").
Cf. Tanya Talaga, U.S. Must Approve of Sale to Chinese, THESTAR.COM
6.
2
(Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2012/1 /18/us-must-approve-sale
_of nexen to chinese.html [http://perma.cclNJW4-8NBD] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) ("A
Chinese presence in the Gulf hasn't been warmly welcomed by some U.S. senators,
American energy executives and those with anti-Chinese sentiments that flared during
the recent presidential election.").
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Both the United States7 and Canada8 reserve the right to block a
foreign investment transaction on national security grounds.
However, some U.S. politicians have proposed that the United States
should also consider "economic security" in addition to national
security.9 U.S. concerns about China have manifested themselves in
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission's 2012
Annual Report where the key recommendations included mandatory
review of all acquisitions by Chinese-owned or controlled entities as
well as a broader "net economic benefit" test for all foreign
investments reviewed by the U.S. government.10
Unlike the United States, Canada already has a "net benefit"
test that it can apply in addition to a national security review. Under
the Investment Canada Act," the Canadian government may block a
proposed foreign acquisition if it does not believe it is of net benefit to
Canada. 12 Recent amendments to the Investment Canada Act
potentially render any foreign investment transaction (whose value
exceeds legislated monetary thresholds), including one involving an
SOE, subject to a net benefit review.1 a The term "net benefit" is not
defined under the legislation, but the Canadian government has
issued guidelines outlining the general principles used in the exercise
of its discretion.' 4 Perhaps fearful that SOEs would pursue political

7.
See generally JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 3-4 (2013),
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf [http://perma.cclW9JT-J7VT]
(archived Sept. 30, 2014) (discussing the legal authority under which the U.S.
government may review or block a foreign investment transaction).
8.
See generally J. Anthony VanDuzer, Mixed Signals: What Recent

Developments Tell Us About CanadianForeignInvestment Policy, 10 ASPER REV. INT'L
Bus. & TRADE L. 247, 248 (2010) (explaining that Canada is required to review foreign
investment transactions).

9.
See Matthew R. Byrne, ProtectingNational Security and PromotingForeign
Investment: Maintainingthe Exon-Florio Balance, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 881-82 (2006)
(noting that several Congress members proposed wide ranging changes including
Senator Richard Shelby, chair of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee, to add economic security concerns as part of the review of proposed foreign
investment).
10.
U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM'N, 2012 REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE
U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 23 (2012), available at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/
files/annual reports/2012-Report-to-Congress-Executive%20Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/
5QUQ-USKQ] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) ('The Commission recommends ... prohibit[ing]
investment in a U.S. industry by a foreign company whose government prohibits
foreign investment in that same industry.").
11.
Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.28 (Can.).
12.
See id. § 23(3).
13.
See infra Part II.C (discussing the Canadian foreign investment review
regime).
14.
See Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.28, § 38 (Can.) ("The Minister
may issue and publish, in such manner as the Minister deems appropriate, guidelines
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motives instead of profit, the guidelines note that SOEs are
"susceptible to state influence."15 Accordingly, the Canadian SOE
Guidelines state that SOEs are expected to "demonstrate their strong
commitment to transparent and commercial operations" and will be
6
examined upon their "adherence to free market principles."' In this
sense, the Canadian SOE Guidelines are similar to the international
voluntary code known as the Santiago Principles that set forth
7
guidance regarding how SWFs should behave and be governed.' In
addition to stressing that SWFs should be transparent, 18 the
Santiago Principles promote commercial orientation by requiring that
the SWF publicly disclose financial information in order to
"demonstrate its economic and financial orientation" as well as "aim
20
to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns."
Should the United States follow the Canadian example by
enacting a net benefit test along with particular screening of
government-influenced entities such as SOEs and SWFs?
This Article argues that the United States should not adopt a
Canadian-style net benefit test. It also argues that Canada should
replace its current net benefit test with a regulatory regime, inspired
by competition law, which focuses on the potential for harm by large
aggregations of power, regardless of whether these aggregations are
labeled as domestic or foreign. Although well intentioned, a net
benefit approach is problematic because it implicitly relies upon
distinctions of public/private and foreign/domestic for its
and interpretation notes with respect to the application and administration of any
provision of this Act or the regulations.").
Investment Canada Act, Guidelines-Investment by State-Owned
15.
Enterprises-NetBenefit Assessment, INDUSTRY CANADA, http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/icalic.nsf/eng/lk00064.html#p2 (last visited Oct. 1, 2014) [http://perma.cc/RUN8-C3VD]
(archived Sept. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Canadian SOE Guidelines].
Id.
16.
17.
INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS,
GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (GAPP) - SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES

[hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES], availableat http://www.iwg.swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm
[http://perma.cc/9KD2-ETC4) (archived Sept. 14, 2014). The twenty-six current
members of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds include
Canada: Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund; China: China Investment Corporation;
and the United States: Alaska Permanent Fund. See INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP
OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS-GENERALLY ACCEPTED
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES "SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES" 28 (2008), available at

http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf [http://perma.cc/GQJ7-GTHP]
(archived Sept. 14, 2014).
See SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 17. The GAPP 2 Principle states that
18.
"[t]he policy purpose of the SWF should be clearly defined and publicly disclosed." Id.
Id. ("Relevant financial information regarding the SWF should be publicly
19.
disclosed to demonstrate its economic and financial orientation, so as to contribute to
stability in international financial markets and enhance trust in recipient countries.").
Id. ("The SWF's investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted
20.
financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy, and based on
economic and financial grounds.").
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implementation. This Article advances the claim that an increasingly
globalized world has blurred the conceptual boundaries that
demarcate these distinctions resulting in an incomplete capture of the
societal harms that the Canadian and U.S. governments seek to
address. In this sense, the discussion here draws upon the insights of
Professor Larry CatA Backer who has characterized these distinctions
in the context of public authorities as shareholders (as well as SWFs)
as "grounded in a stubborn belief in the separability of public and
private law."2 1
SOEs and SWFs are conceptually problematic because they
blend elements of hitherto separate categories. Although they purport
to privately invest in the economy, they are also foreign public
entities who may act politically. 22 Current approaches try to mitigate
this problem by requiring that the foreign public entity act in a
"private" (i.e., commercially based) manner. In his critique of how the
Santiago Principles have attempted to regulate SWFs (albeit through
a voluntary code) Backer argues that the Santiago Principles were
based upon two critical assumptions.2 3 The first critical assumption is
that private funds are purely commercial in the sense that they act
apolitically. 24 The second one is that private behavior can be modeled
and prescribed to SWFs.25
This Article builds upon Backer's insights by drawing upon them
to develop a framework for analyzing Canadian FDI reviews and the
U.S. experience. This Article argues that the Canadian SOE
Guidelines are based upon two flawed assumptions. The first
assumption is that one can distinguish state-owned interests from
private interests. Over a century ago, U.S. legal scholars (particularly
those scholars known as "Legal Realists") punctured the neoliberal
myth of a firm demarcation between market-based (i.e., private)

21.
Larry CatA Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: PublicAuthorities as
Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Element in
PrivateChoice of Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1, 62 (2008).
22.
See Larry CatA Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons:
The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance Through
Private Global Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 425, 433 (2010) [hereinafter Backer,
Sovereign] ("When states seek to be treated like private entities with respect to certain
of their activities, and when private funds seek to assert a regulatory authority with
respect to certain of their activities, the old jurisdictional divides between the state and
the private sector, between public and private law regimes, must be substantially
weakened.").
23.
See. id. at 430-31.
24.
See id. at 430 ("The first is that private funds have no regulatory effectthey do not project political power as states do, or for the same ends.").
25.
See id. at 430-31 ("The second is that it is possible to model those private
behaviors and use this as a benchmark for distinguishing between benign sovereign
wealth fund activities-activities that ought not to be specially regulated-from
political sovereign wealth fund activities that might be specially regulated.").
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behavior from government (i.e., public) action. 26 This Article argues
that ambiguous identities through private equity funds as well as
"nonequity" modes of influence generated through global value chains
make it difficult to capture the full range of foreign state interests.
The second assumption is that one can meaningfully segregate
entities on the basis of whether they behave commercially and
prescribe such behavior. Glimpses of the difficulty of attempting to
define commercial behavior arise when one reviews the debate about
shareholder primacy2 7 and profit maximization that has dominated
28
Anglo-American corporate law scholarship. Moreover, the recent
ascendancy of socially-conscious investing by influential banks and
organizations suggests that private entities are transcending purely
commercial concerns. Both the U.S. and Canadian governments have
recently enacted legislation creating special corporations that may
pursue social enterprise. 2 9 These corporations pursue profit but may
subordinate profit motives to the generation of social contributions
(e.g., the environment, creation of employment), suggesting that the
imposition of purely commercial motives upon foreigners is based on a
perspective that is currently being undermined even in the United
States and Canada. The danger from the dually flawed Canadian
approach is that its ambiguity, incoherency, and substantial
discretion, left in the hands of the government, renders it vulnerable
to capture by domestic interests (e.g., lobby groups) who may advance
a protectionist agenda not for the good of the country but for their
30
own pecuniary gain.

See generally AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher 1II, Morton J.
26.
Horwitz & Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993) (collecting important excerpts of seminal works
in American legal realism theory). Chapter 4-"The Critique of the Public/Private
Distinction"-is particularly relevant to the arguments advanced in this Article. See id.
at 98-121; see also Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 467,
467 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986))
(asserting that legal realism has "fundamentally altered our conceptions of legal
reasoning and of the relationship between law and society").
See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming CorporateLaw in a New Gilded Age,
27.
2 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 8-9 (2008) (commenting on the prevalence of shareholder
primacy thinking).
See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3
28.
VA. L. & Bus. REV. 163, 164 (2008) (arguing that the case relied upon for establishing
that there is a legal duty to maximize profits for shareholders has been misread).
See, e.g., William H. Clark & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit
29.
CorporationsareRedefining the Purpose of Business Corporations,38 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 817, 818 (2012) (providing an overview of benefit corporations as an example of
how the purpose of the business corporation is evolving); Carol Liao, The Next Stage of
CSR in Canada: Transformational Corporate Governance, Hybrid Legal Structures,
and the Growth of Social Enterprise,9 MCGILL INT'L J. SuST. DEV. L. & POL'Y 56, 79-80
(2013) (referring to the enactment of the "community contribution company" in British
Columbia and similar legislation in Nova Scotia.)
RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
30.
TRANSACTIONS 838 (3d ed. 2010) ("Essentially all nations limit foreign investment,
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Beyond SOEs and SWFs lies an interesting question: why is the
Canadian government even assessing the merits of a proposed
transaction to begin with? Like the United States, Canada already
has national security interest provisions that empower the
government to review and block proposed foreign investments. 31
Thus, the Canadian net benefit provisions must contemplate grounds
other than national security. Going beyond national security issues
seems to contradict the Canadian SOE Guidelines concern for the
sanctity of "free market" principles. 3 2 Interestingly, immediately after
mentioning "free market" principles, the Canadian SOE Guidelines
state that "[t]he Minister will assess the effect of the investment on
the level and nature of economic activity in Canada, including the
effect on employment, production and capital levels in Canada." 33
This form of macroeconomic engineering is politically distant from the
neoliberal free market ideology espoused only one sentence earlier.
The incoherency of the Canadian approach is a result of reliance
upon old distinctions of public/private and domestic/foreign in an
increasingly globalized world. Rather than relying on categorizations
of domestic/foreign and public/private, this Article suggests that the
law should focus on societal harms regardless of the identity of the
actors involved. 34 It advances the claim that the real fear should be
the harm that can be inflicted by aggregations of economic power,
whether they are ideologically distant foreign governments pursuing
political goals or powerful domestic corporations pursuing profit by
selling subprime mortgages. Western scholars, from as early as the
late eighteenth century, understood that a neoliberal conception of a
free market necessarily entailed the infliction of harm by parties
upon each other for which there was no legal compensation-a

including the most developed nations. The reasons may appear to be different, but may
mask the most common reason-the protection of domestic industries.").
31.
See Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.28, § 25.4(1) (Can.) ("(1) [T]he
Governor in Council may, by order, within the prescribed period, take any measures in
respect of the investment that the Governor in Council considers advisable to protect
national security .... .").
32.
Cf. Canadian SOE Guidelines, supra note 15 (providing that when
assessing the net benefit of acquisitions of control, "the Minister will examine ... the
corporate governance and reporting structure of the non-Canadian. This examination
will include whether the non-Canadian adheres to Canadian standards of corporate
governance ... and to Canadian laws and practices, including adherence to free
market principles.").
33.

Id.

34.
Inspired by Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, this Article attempts to
modestly advance our understanding through its analysis. See Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Sovereign Wealth Funds-DistinguishingAspects and Opportunities, in SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUNDS AND LONG-TERM INVESTING 26, 31 (Patrick Bolton, Frederic Samama

& Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2012) ("Academia can play a particularly important role in
answering these questions. It is a space in our society in which deeper thinking about

the major challenges going on in our world occurs.").
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doctrine named damnum absque injuria. 35 Some harms are
considered socially acceptable because they promote competition and
free enterprise, but there are limits. An example of such limits can be
found in Canadian competition law, which prohibits conspiracies such
as price-fixing. 6 Given that competition law deals extensively with
both the promotion of markets and aggregations of power, this Article
suggests that competition law should serve as the basis of addressing
the concerns raised by SOEs and SWFs.
Part II of this Article discusses background context: statecontrolled entities (SWF and SOEs) and U.S. and Canadian foreign
investment regimes. Part III examines and compares the U.S. and
Canadian national security review regimes while noting their
political contexts. Part IV explores the fragile rationale of the
Canadian net benefit provisions and its link to the Canadian SOE
Guidelines. It claims that the Canadian SOE Guidelines are based on
the two flawed assumptions discussed earlier and advances that
claim through its examination of investment funds, global value
chains, and the inclusion of noncommercial motives in private
corporations as well as the rise of social entrepreneurship. Part V
examines the claim that state-owned enterprises benefit unfairly
from government subsidies to distill the problems identified earlier
into a concrete example. It suggests that infliction of harm, regardless
of identity actor, should form the basis of a future regulatory
structure addressing the issue of aggregations of power that include
foreign investment.
Thus, this Article builds upon Backer's work by examining SOEs
and SWFs specifically within the context of U.S. and Canadian
foreign investment frameworks, revealing problems with old
categorical distinctions in the face of globalization and increasingly
socially conscious entrepreneurship, and it contributes toward
advancing a regulatory framework that can potentially address these
problems.
II. CONTEXT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA

This section reviews the differences between SWFs and SOEs as
well as some of the characteristics that have prompted concern from a
See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical
35.
Jurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, WIS. L. REV. 975, 1025-26 (1982) (discussing
the general concept of damnum absque injuria).
See, e.g., Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, §45(1)(c) (Can.) ("(1) Every
36.
person commits an offence who, with a competitor of that person with respect to a
product, conspires, agrees or arranges .. . (c) to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen
or eliminate the production or supply of the product.").
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foreign investment review perspective. It then outlines the foreign
investment review frameworks of both the United States and Canada,
noting the important differences between them.
A. State-ControlledEntities
SWFs and SOEs are simply the government form of what are
commonly regarded as investment funds and business enterprises.
The fact that they are owned by a public entity, the government, as
opposed to private individuals, is the distinguishing factor. SWFs
typically represent surplus revenue that a government has to invest.
Specifically, one scholar has defined them as "government investment
vehicles but not reserve funds managed by central banks; they can
cover future public retirement, but do not have direct pension
liability." 3 Like most investment funds, they are pooled and
managed. To the extent that the nation has surplus funds that exceed
its foreign reserves, money may be invested in a separate fund-the
SWF.38 Since it represents a luxurious overage, these SWFs have the
potential to be invested less conservatively with a view to earning
higher returns. This is because foreign reserves provide a nation with
an emergency source of cash and are thus invested with a view
toward short-term liquidity, albeit at the price of lower interest
rates.39
Although SWFs gravitate toward long-term investing, 40 their
investment motives can be broad and varied, ranging from pension
administration to broader goals such as stabilizing the economy. 41
The concept of SWFs is over half a century old, 42 and SWFs are
37.
Xu Yi-chong, The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 1, 3 (Xu Yi-chong & Gawdat
Bahgat eds., 2010) (noting that there is a lack of agreement on the exact details beyond
the definition that the author has offered); cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt,
Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance:A Minimalist Response to the New
Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1354 (2008) ("Like some other entities active in
global finance such as hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds defy attempts at
straightforward definition. In essence, they are equity investment vehicles established
by and under the control of sovereign states.").
38.
Cf. ERIC C. ANDERSON, TAKE THE MONEY AND RUN: SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY 14 (2009).
39.
See id. ("[Iln order to ensure ready availability in time of crisis or market
fluctuation, foreign reserves have normally been invested in short-term 'safe'
markets.").
40.
See Stiglitz, supra note 34, at 26 ("As state-owned entities, they have a
longer-term horizon than many investors.").
41.
See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 37, at 1355 (including among the
objectives of such funds "stabilization of the macroeconomic effects of sudden increases
in export earnings, the management of pension assets or a separate tranche of foreignexchange reserves, or the intergenerational transfer of wealth").
42.
See id. at 1354 (noting also that SWFs have operated in "relative obscurity"
until recently).

2014/1

FDI IN THE UNITED S TA TES AND CANADA

1271

believed to have originated with the Kiribati Revenue Equalization
Reserve Fund (Micronesian Gilbert Islands) and later adopted in
Middle Eastern countries. 43 Currently, the range of countries that
have SWFs has greatly expanded to include superpowers such as the
United States of America and China as well as Australia, Canada,
Russia, and Japan. 44 The China Investment Corporation is funded
through excess revenue generated through international trade,
although many other SWFs are funded through their natural
45
resources (e.g., Middle Eastern countries).
There are two aspects about SWFs that render them vulnerable
to being viewed with suspicion. First, historically, SWFs have not
been transparent about their long-term goals or financial affairs
compared to publicly traded corporations-although the Norwegian
government pension fund may be a notable exception. 46 As noted
earlier, the development of the Santiago Principles as a voluntary
code for SWFs was a reaction to this lack of transparency. 47 Second,
SWFs are owned and controlled by governments and, ultimately, may
pursue noncommercial objectives. More bluntly put, the fear is that
SWFs may also be pursuing "hidden political agendas." 48
Of course, clandestine and nefarious motives are not enough to
generate significant harm unless there is substantial economic power
supporting them. This is where fears about SWFs become
intensified-since 1990 SWFs have been growing, 49 and the U.N.

See ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 16 ("In each case, the underlying premise
43.
was the same-invest the earnings from an exhaustible natural resource in a manner
that would benefit future generations and/or potentially secure an existing
regime.. .. ").
See LIxiA LOH, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: STATES BUYING THE WORLD
44.
102-15 (2010) (providing a chart listing various countries which have sovereign wealth
funds and briefly summarizing their investment regimes); see also International
Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 17, at 28 (providing a list of
many nations with SWFs).
See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 37, at 1354-55 ("Most sovereign wealth
45.
funds are financed by the sale of commodities, especially oil.").
See id. at 1355 ("The level of transparency also differs significantly. The
46.
Norway Government Pension Fund provides full disclosure of its portfolio and
investment policies. Most SWFs, on the other hand, provide virtually no public
disclosure.").
47.
See Udaibir S. Das, Adnan Mazarei & Alison Stuart, Sovereign Wealth
Funds and the Santiago Principles, in ECONOMICS OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 59,
65-70 (Udaibir S. Das, Adnan Mazarei & Han van der Hoorn eds., 2010) (discussing
the development of the Santiago Principles and the issues which they address,
including transparency and governance).
48.
Kathryn Gordon & David Gaukrodger, Foreign Government-Controlled
Investors and Host Country Investment Policies: OECD Perspectives, in SOVEREIGN
INVESTMENT: CONCERNS AND POLICY REACTIONS 496, 498 (Karl P. Sauvant, Lisa E.
Sachs & Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed eds., 2012).
See ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 16 ("The total size of sovereign wealth
49.
funds has dramatically increased since 1990.").
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Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports that
SWFs, in 2012, collectively managed $5.3 trillion of assets. 50
UNCTAD also notes that SWF participation in FDI is two times that
of the previous year but is still relatively small at $20 billion. 5 '
Although UNCTAD states that the $127 billion worth of cumulative
SWF FDI is relatively small, it is likely an underestimation because
UNCTAD's data does not account for indirect investments by SWFs;
it only includes investments where SWFs are the sole investors.52
Concerns about SWFs also arose when they started investing in
troubled financial institutions during the Financial Crisis of 200708.53 Merrill Lynch and Citigroup received $21 billion from South
Korea, Singapore, and Kuwait SWFs in early 2008-part of the
approximately $69 billion received by investment banks from SWFs
in the financial crisis at that time. 54 Although some regarded SWFs
as a potentially valuable source of assistance, 5 others in the
government warned about the political nature of SWFs. 56 In
retrospect, SWFs came to regret their investments in the postfinancial crisis aftermath, and "[t]he perception of SWFs as saviors of
the Western financial system was as exaggerated as that of the SWF
as threats that preceded the financial crisis .

.

. SWFs in 2007 and

2008 proved to be neither an unqualified threat nor an unqualified
salvation for anyone involved."5 7 Notwithstanding this assessment of
the neutral impact of SWFs, they still have difficulty convincing
outsiders that they will act apolitically. 58 Thus, the Santiago

50.
See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013:
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT 10, U.N. Sales No.
E.13.II.D.5 (2013) [hereinafter UNCTAD] (noting that developing economies counted
for eighty percent of the SWF capitalization).
51.
See id. ("SWF FDI flows doubled in 2012, from $10 billion to over $20
billion, bucking the global trend. . . .").
52.
See id. ("However, UNCTAD figures for FDI by SWFs capture only
investments in which SWFs are the sole and immediate investors.").
53.
See EDWIN M. TRUMAN, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: THREAT OR
SALVATION? 3-5 (2010) ("In the fall of 2007, as the global financial crisis gained
momentum, views about SWFs moderated somewhat."). Truman also states: "Five
years ago, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) were so unknown that there was no common
term to describe government-owned funds that invested in whole or in part outside
their home country." Id. at 1.
54.
See The Invasion of the Sovereign-Wealth Funds, EcONOMIST (Jan. 17,
2008, 12:29 PM), http://www.economist.com/node/10533866 [http://perma.cc/C79DJJWLI (archived Sept. 14, 2014) ("They have deftly played the role of saviour just when
Western banks have been exposed as the Achilles heel of the global financial system.").
55.
See id. ("At first sight this is proof that capitalism works. Money is flowing
from countries with excess savings to those that need it. . . . But there are still two sets
of concerns.").
56.
See Stiglitz, supra note 34, at 29 (referring to Larry Summers, who would
later act as head of President Obama's National Economic Council).
57.
TRUMAN, supra note 53, at 4.
58.
See Gordon & Graukrodger, supra note 48, at 498-502.
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Principles may partially alleviate this problem. Although others have
proposed novel solutions, such as having an external fund manager
administer the SWFs assets, a recent study suggests that this might
not necessarily be effective. 59
Although SWFs could potentially exert influence on the
operations of their investments, they are generally regarded as being
more passive than SOEs. SOEs are active because they actually
engage in operations and management. For example, after CNOOC
purchased Nexen, the chair of Nexen's board of directors was
assumed by Li Fanrong, who was also the CEO of CNOOC. 60
UNCTAD reports that the significance of SOEs has actually
increased over the last three decades despite the global proliferation
of privatization. 61 SOEs, although fewer in number, have
consolidated. This has resulted in an elevated level of economic
dominance such that the world's top one hundred transnational
corporations include eighteen SOEs. 62 China stands out with regard
to SOEs: the top 150 largest firms in China all have the Chinese
government as the largest shareholder. 63
Being state-controlled entities, SOEs are also subject to the
suspicion that they may be operated for political goals rather than
profit maximization. In fact, given the higher level of control that
SOEs have over business operations compared to SWFs, the potential
for directing the business toward political ends is higher. SOEs
represent an important tool for governments when they wish to
intervene in the economy 64 and thus sit uncomfortably with free
market ideologies. SOEs are also regarded negatively in Western
market-based economies because they may benefit from direct or
indirect government subsidies-an issue that has caused tension

See Andrd de Palma, Luc Leruth & Adnan Mazarei, Regulating a Sovereign
59.
Wealth Fund Through an External Fund Manager, in ECONOMICS OF SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUNDS 95, 110 (Udaibir S. Das, Adnan Mazarei & Han van der Hoorn eds.,
2010) ("The results show that, under reasonable assumptions, the use of fund
managers may not necessarily address these concerns. This result holds when an SWF
pursues only its profit-maximization motives, but even more so when it pursues
multiple objectives, including learning by investing.").
See Krugel, supra note 2.
60.
See UNCTAD, supra note 50, at 12.
61.
See id. ("Although the number of SOEs has been shrinking, their market
62.
power has been increasing, in part due to their consolidation into national champions
across a range of strategic industries. There are now 18 SOEs among the world's top
100 TNCs.").
See id. ("The Chinese State is the largest shareholder in that country's 150
63.
biggest firms .... ).
See Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed, Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant,
64.
Sovereign Investment: An Introduction, in SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT: CONCERNS AND
POLICY REACTIONS 1, 9 (Karl P. Sauvant, Lisa E. Sachs & Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongloed
eds., 2012) ("SOEs have been at the forefront of sovereign intervention in the economy
for centuries.").
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between the United States and China with respect to international
trade. 65 Despite the negative perception that SOEs may act
politically, 10 percent of all the world's FDI outflow is attributable to
state-owned transnational corporations. 66
B. American Foreign Investment Review
The U.S. legislative authority for conducting a review of foreign
investments is primarily found in section 721 of the Defense
Production Act of 1950.67 Although the legislation has gone through
numerous amendments since its initial enactment, 68 the discussion
below only focuses on the points relevant to this Article's arguments.
The basis for conducting a review of foreign investment is upon
grounds of national security. This is triggered whenever there is any
merger or acquisition that could result in foreign control of any
person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States (referred
to as a "covered transaction").6 9 The committee that oversees the
review is known as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS).7 0 If there is a "covered transaction," then
either the parties to the transaction may notify the CFIUS, or the
President or CFIUS may unilaterally conduct a review. 71 If the
proposed transaction ultimately results in the control of any person
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States by a foreign
government or entity controlled by a foreign government, then a
review by the CFIUS is automatically triggered. 72 Thus, most
proposed acquisitions by SOEs will attract a CFIUS review.
The key here is whether the transaction is foreign government
controlled. The term "control" is not directly defined in the legislation.
However, the Treasury Department has issued regulations
specifically delineating which types of transactions will not be subject
to review. ' Generally, transactions that are merely regarded as

65.
Cf. SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41007, UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM 11 (2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41007.pdf [http://perma.cc/SKC3-53EL] (archived Sept.
14, 2014) (referring to the matter as a "point of friction").
66.
See UNCTAD, supranote 50, at 12.
67.
See generally 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170.
68.
See generally JARED T. BROWN & DANIEL H. ELSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43118, THE

DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF

1950: HISTORY,

AUTHORITIES, AND

REAUTHORIZATION 3 (2013), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natseclR43118.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Z5PD-5E95] (archived Sept. 22, 2014) (discussing generally the history
of the Defense Production Act, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798 (1950)).
69.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(3).
70.
See id. § 2170(a)(1).
71.
Id. § 2170(b)(1)(A).
72.
Id. § 2170(b)(1)(B).
73.
See 31 C.F.R. § 800.302 (2013) (describing five transactions that are not
considered "covered transactions").
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passive investments will not be treated as covered transactions and
will be exempted from CFIUS review. In order to qualify as a passive
investment, the transaction cannot result in the ownership of more
than 10 percent of the voting securities of the firm. 74 This rule
became important immediately after the financial crisis, when many
SWFs invested in distressed Western financial institutions such as
Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, because SWF investments, which were
under the 10 percent threshold, did not have to undergo a CFIUS
review.7 5
Once initiated, a CFIUS review is completed within thirty
days. 76 If the review determines that there is (1) a national security
concern, (2) a foreign government controlled transaction, or (3) the
transaction would result in the control of a critical infrastructure by a
foreign person, then the CFIUS may proceed to conduct a forty-fiveday investigation." Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the
ultimate decision resides with the President, who may suspend or
prohibit the proposed transaction. 78 Although the term "national
security" is not specifically defined, there is a nonexhaustive list of
eleven factors that the President may consider. 79 The President's
80
decision on this matter is final and not subject to judicial review.
The present legislation now codifies what used to be an informal
practice by the CFIUS to enter into mitigation agreements with the
transaction parties during or prior to the review period. These
mitigation agreements allowed the transaction parties to address
potential national security concerns by rearranging the transaction so
as to either eliminate or minimize, to an acceptable level, the risks to
national security.81 The present legislation now specifically allows the
CFIUS (or lead agency on its behalf) to enter into these mitigation

See id. § 800.302(b). The regulations also exempt other forms of
74.
transactions, such as acquisitions by securities underwriters or insurers in the
ordinary course of business, stock splits, or stock dividends, acquisition of securities
that do not result in a change of control and parent-subsidiary acquisitions. See id.
See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33312, THE ExON75.
FLORIO NATIONAL SECURITY TEST FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 6 (2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natseclRL33312.pdf [http://perma.cc/SY2W-GQ2R] (archived
Oct. 1, 2014) ("In some cases, the foreign investments have accounted for less than 10%
of the voting securities of the firm and were classified as investments only for the
purpose of investment apparently to avoid a CFIUS review or investigation.").
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(E).
76.
See id. § 2170(b)(2)(C).
77.
See id. § 2170(d)(1).
78.
See id. § 2170(f).
79.
See id. § 2170(e) ("The actions of the President under paragraph (1) of
80.
subsection (d) of this section and the findings of the President under paragraph (4) of
subsection (d) of this section shall not be subject to judicial review.").
See JACKSON, supra note 75, at 19 ("Presently, CFIUS must designate a
81.
lead agency to negotiate, modify, monitor, and enforce agreements in order to mitigate
any threat to national security.").
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agreements with' the transaction parties. 82 The CFIUS's designated
lead agency is also responsible for the monitoring and enforcement of
the mitigation agreement.8 3
Although the final decision about whether to block a transaction
resides solely with the President, the CFIUS is required to provide
reports to particular members of Congress.8 4 In addition, the CFIUS
is to provide an annual report to Congress regarding its activities,
particularly those relating to covered transactions and critical
technologies.8 5
C. CanadianForeignInvestment Review
Proposed foreign investment transactions are reviewed by the
Canadian government pursuant to the Investment Canada Act.8 6
Unlike the U.S. approach, Canada has two streams of review, which
are not mutually exclusive. First, like the United States, Canada may
block investments on national security grounds. 87 There are no
minimum monetary thresholds for a national security review, and the
only criterion is that there must be a non-Canadian seeking to either
establish a new Canadian business or acquire control of a Canadian
business. 88 If the Minister reasonably believes that a proposed
investment could be injurious to national security, then the Minister
may order a review.8 9
Upon a review, the Minister may order the relevant transaction
parties to provide information in order to assess whether the
proposed investment is a risk to national security.9 0 Upon completion
of the review, the Canadian government may either block the

82.
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(1)(1)(A) ("The Committee or a lead agency may,
on behalf of the Committee, negotiate, enter into or impose, and enforce any agreement
or condition with any party to the covered transaction in order to mitigate any threat to
the national security of the United States that arises as a result of the covered
transaction.").
83.
See id. § 2170(1)(3)(A).
84.
See id. § 2170(b)(3)(C)(iii).
85.
See id. § 2170(m) (describing the contents of the annual report that is to be
provided to Congress).
86.
See Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28, § 2 (Can.) ("[T]he purposes
of this Act are to provide for the review of significant investments in Canada by nonCanadians in a manner that encourages investment, economic growth and employment
opportunities in Canada and to provide for the review of investments in Canada by
non-Canadians that could be injurious to national security.").
87.
See id. § 25.2(1) (providing for ministerial action and review where "the
Minister has reasonable grounds to believe that an investment by a non-Canadian
could be injurious to national security. . .
See id. § 25.1.
88.
See supra note 87.
89.

90.

See id. § 25.2(3).
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investment or allow it.9 1 Like the American approach with mitigation
agreements, the Canadian government can conditionally approve the
investment provided that the parties provide written undertakings to
the Canadian government. 9 2 The government's decision is final and
not subject to review or appeal except for administrative review.9 3 In
Canada, there are no public guidelines as to how discretion will be
exercised.9 4
In addition to national security, the Canadian government may
also review a transaction in order to assess whether it is of net benefit
to Canada. 9 If the proposed investment transaction exceeds a
minimum monetary threshold, then it-is potentially subject to a net
benefit review by the Canadian government. For investors from nonWorld Trade Organization (WTO) member countries, the thresholds
are fairly low: $5 million for direct investments 96 and $50 million for
indirect transactions.9 7 However, the levels for investors from WTO
member countries 9 are substantially higher and have been
increasing from year to year as determined by regulations 99 enacted
by the government. As of 2014, the threshold is $354 million
dollars. 0 0
Recent amendments to the Investment Canada Act can capture
almost any investment involving an SOE. For example, there is a safe
harbor zone, which indicates that "the acquisition of less than one

See id. § 25.4(1) (providing for powers of the Governor in Council).
91.
92.
See id. § 25.4(1)(b)(i).
See id. § 25.6 ("Decisions and orders of the Governor in Council, and
93.
decisions of the Minister, under this Part are final and binding and, except for judicial
review under the Federal Courts Act, are not subject to appeal or to review by any
court.").
See J. Anthony VanDuzer, supra note 8, at 252 (2010) ("[U]nder the
94.
Investment CanadaAct, the criteria to be applied by the Minister are broad and openended .... ).
See Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28, § 16(1) (Can.) ("A non95.
Canadian shall not implement an investment reviewable under this Part unless the
investment has been reviewed under this Part and the Minister is satisfied or is
deemed to be satisfied that the investment is likely to be of net benefit to Canada.").
See id. § 14(3).
96.
See id. § 14(4) ("An investment described in paragraph (1)(d) is reviewable
97.
under this Part where the value, calculated in the manner prescribed, of the assets of
the entity carrying on the Canadian business, and of all other entities in Canada, the
control of which is acquired, directly or indirectly, is fifty million dollars or more.").
98.
See id. § 14.1 (defining limits for WTO investors).
See id. § 14.2 ("The Governor in Council may make any regulations that the
99.
Governor in Council considers necessary for carrying out the purposes and provisions
of section 14.1.").
100.
Investment Canada Act, Thresholds for Review, INDUSTRY CANADA,
(last visited Oct. 1, 2014)
https://www.ic.gc.caleic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/hlkoo5O.html
[http://perma.cc/AZP5-XQRR] (archived Sept. 22, 2014) (noting that the thresholds are
reviewed every year). "The amount is equivalent to the growth in Nominal Gross
Domestic product at market prices as published by Statistics Canada for specified
periods, multiplied by the amount determined for the previous year." Id.
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third of the voting shares of a corporation . . . is deemed not to be the

acquisition of control of that corporation."1 01 This means that such an
acquisition would not attract a net benefit review. But under the new
rules, the government may nevertheless regard any transaction as
being an acquisition of control if it is satisfied that the entity is, in
fact, controlled by a SOE. 02 Similarly, although an acquisition by a
Canadian would not trigger a review, the government may treat it as
a non-Canadian if it believes it is in fact controlled by a SOE.10 3
Furthermore, the definition of a SOE is expansive and includes
indirect control or any person "acting under the influence" of a foreign
government. 104
The default position of the Investment Canada Act is that a
reviewable transaction is prohibited unless the government is
satisfied that the investment is likely to be one of net benefit to
Canada.10 5 The legislation does not define or provide any guidance as
to the meaning of "net benefit." However, the Canadian SOE
Guidelines10 6 issued by Industry Canada provide guidance regarding
how the net benefit assessment might apply to SOEs. There are two
important aspects to note. First, the Canadian SOE Guidelines
comment that SOEs are "susceptible to state influence" 0 7 and are
expected to address this in their discussions with the Canadian
government. Investors are expected to "demonstrate their strong
commitment to transparent and commercial operations." 108 The
government's examination of the SOE will also include an assessment
of whether it adheres to "free market principles" and whether it will
"likely operate on a commercial basis." The foregoing language
expresses the common concern that SOEs might operate on a
noncommercial basis (with the fear perhaps that they pursue
politically motivated objectives).
As is the case for all net benefit reviews, foreign investors bear
the burden of proof of satisfying the Canadian government that the
proposed investment is likely to be of net benefit to Canada. 0 9 Under
the Investment Canada Act, one tool available to investors is the

101.
Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28, § 28(3)(d) (Can.).
102.
See id. § 28(6.1).
103.
See id. § 26(2.31).
104.
See id. § 3.
105.
See id. § 16(1) ("A non-Canadian shall not implement an investment
reviewable under this Part unless the investment has been reviewed under this Part
and the Minister is satisfied or is deemed to be satisfied that the investment is likely to
be of benefit to Canada.").
106.
Canadian SOE Guidelines, supra note 15.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
See id. ("Under the Act, the burden of proof is on foreign investors to
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Minister that proposed investments are likely to
be of net benefit to Canada.").
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possibility of entering into undertakings and agreements with the
government"o in order to allay any concerns about the SOE. The
Canadian SOE Guidelines state that examples of possible
undertakings used in the past include "the appointment of Canadians
as independent directors on the Board of Directors, the employment
of Canadians in senior management positions, incorporation of the
business in Canada, and the listing of the shares of the acquiring
company or the Canadian business being acquired on a Canadian
stock exchange."111
The Canadian government will also monitor whether the
undertakings have been complied with. If a foreign investor fails to
comply with the undertaking, the Canadian government may send a
notice to the foreign investor demanding that the undertaking be
complied with" 2 or, alternatively, accept a new undertaking provided
that the government is satisfied it is likely to be of net benefit to
Canada. " Ultimately, if a foreign investor fails to comply with
undertakings entered into with the Canadian government, a
Canadian court may order a number of different remedies, including
requiring the foreigner divest itself of control of the Canadian
business,114ordering injunctions, 1 5 directing the foreign investor to
comply with written undertakings, 116 imposing a penalty not
exceeding $10,000 each day," 7 and suspending the voting rights of
11 8
the foreign investor in its acquired assets.
Overall, Canadian foreign investment review laws are less
welcoming toward FDI than those of the United States. Both
countries have national security reviews (regardless of level of
investment), and the term "national security" is not defined in the
laws of either country. However, the U.S. law at least provides a nonexhaustive list of twelve factors to be considered by the President
which, coupled with the reports to Congress, provide some form of
democratic transparency in the process. In contrast, Canadian law
provides no guidance on the meaning of the term "national security."
Further, the Canadian review process goes beyond national security
concerns by imposing a net benefit review process for large
transactions. The term "net benefit" is not defined, which, in turn,
provides the Canadian government with a great deal of discretion.
Similarly, the definition of an SOE is broad and goes beyond control

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28, § 23(3) (Can.).
Canadian SOE Guidelines, supra note 15.
Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28, § 39(1) (Can.).
Id. § 39.1.
See id. § 40(2)(a).
See id. § 40(2)(b).
See id. § 40(2)(c).
See id. § 40(2)(d).
See id. § 40(2)(f).
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to include indirect influence, which may potentially capture a wide
range of activities. The conduct expected of SOEs under the SOE
Guidelines is similarly vague and speaks only of commercial and
market principles without actually defining those key terms.
Perhaps sensing the problems that such ambiguity might create,
the drafters of the Investment Canada Act included a modest amount
of democratic accountability by requiring that the government
provide a publicly available, annual report on the administration of
the legislation (although there is no indication of what the report
should contain). 11 9 However, government compliance with even this
very modest measure of accountability has been lagging. As of
January 2014, only one such report had been made available on
Industry Canada's website: the 2009-10 Annual Report. Finally, in
early March 2014, the Director of Investments and Industry Canada
posted three years of back-logged annual reports (2010-11, 2011-12
and 2012-13) in a single consolidated report on the Industry Canada
website.120
III. NATIONAL SECURITY: BALANCING INTERESTS IN THE SHADOW OF
POLITICS

This section commences with a discussion of notable U.S. and
Canadian foreign investment reviews, highlighting controversies that
arose. It then examines how foreign investment reviews balance
national security concerns with a desire to attract FDI. It cautions
against the proposed U.S. addition of an "economic security test" or
Canadian-like net benefit test by emphasizing the ambiguity of those
tests along with the potential for politicization and potential capture
by protectionist interests. It concludes with a recommendation that
both the United States and Canada could improve their national

119.
See id. § 38.1 ("The Director shall, for each fiscal year, submit a report on
the administration of this Act, other than Part IV.1, to the Minister and the Minister
shall make the report available to the public.").
120.
Investment
Canada Act,
Annual Reports, INDUSTRY
CANADA,
http://www.ic.gc.caleic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/hlk8l126.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2014)
[http://perma.cc/T2W9-3NV4] (archived Sept. 23, 2014). Although the late reports do
not actually bear a date of issuance, the web pages that link to the report indicate that
those pages were last modified in 2014. In addition, the copyright statement of the
reports bears the date of 2014. In the consolidated report, it is clear from the Director's

message that he is attempting to address the three prior years in a single report and
states: "I am pleased to present the Investment Canada Act annual reports for the
fiscal years 2010-11 through 2012-13." See INDUSTRY CANADA, INVESTMENT CANADA
ACT: ANNUAL REPORTS 2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13 (2014), https://www.ic.gc.caleic/site/icalic.nsf/vwapj/ICAAR_2010-11_2011-12_2012-13-eng.pdf/$FILE/ICAAR_2010-11_201112_2012-13-eng.pdf [http://perma.cclUA32-G9YE] (archived Sept. 30, 2014).
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security tests by supplementing them with a clear set of risk-threatbased guidelines.
A. Notable Past Transactions
Large acquisition transactions occasionally raise eyebrows due to
their potential to result in a monopoly-a concern that is typically
handled by competition law. However, significant acquisitions add
another dimension that can run along a spectrum from
understandable concerns about national security to xenophobia and
local protectionism. A cursory review of selected cases in both the
United States and Canada illuminates the controversy that these
transactions can precipitate in the host country. The lack of
transparency in the review frameworks means that controversial
transactions remain vulnerable to speculations regarding whether
political or protectionist motivations have dominated the internal
decision-making process.
An early case that illustrates the potential for political
speculation is the attempted purchase of MAMCO, manufacturer of
commercial aircraft parts, by a Chinese SOE in 1989.121 The Chinese
government's crackdown on political protest at Tiananmen Square
had recently occurred, leaving some to surmise that this lay at the
heart of President George H.W. Bush's decision to block the
transaction-particularly since the proposed investment "posed no
obvious threat to national security." 2 2 In 1990, the U.S. company,
Norton, was the target of a hostile takeover from British Tire and
Rubber. 123 One hundred and nineteen members of Congress,
prompted by Norton employees concerned for their jobs, called for a
national security investigation. Ultimately, another bid prevailed
from the French conglomerate Compagnie de Saint-Gobain. 124

121.

See Jackie VanDerMeulen & Michael J. Trebilcock, Canada's Policy

Response to Foreign Sovereign Investment: Operationalizing National Security
Exceptions, 47 CAN. Bus. L.J. 392, 427 (2009) ("Many speculated that the decision of
CFIUS to bar the transaction, and of President Bush Sr. to follow these
recommendations, was an attempt by the Bush administration to respond to the recent
events of Tiananmen Square.").
122.
Id.

See Jennifer Cooke, Finding the Right Balance for Sovereign Wealth Fund
123.
Regulation: Open Investment us. National Security, 2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 728, 757
(2009).
124.
See After Defeat, BTR Sells Norton Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1990,
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/27/business/company-news-after-defeat-btr-sellsnorton-stock.html (noting that, notwithstanding its failed bid, BTR still made
approximately $12.2 million profit on the sale of its shares).
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Interestingly, the prevailing bid was better for Norton employees, and
the angst about national security disappeared.1 25
In 2005, Unocal (an American oil corporation) was the subject of
an $18.5 billion acquisition bid from CNOOC.1 26 This was a bid that
competed with U.S. oil company Chevron, which had a prior bid of
$16.8 billion.127 There quickly followed much criticism and concern
about national security, particularly since CNOOC is a SOE,1 28 and
what followed thereafter is noteworthy. CFIUS was unable to conduct
a review because the House of Representatives had passed a
resolution to cut off money to CFIUS, thus frustrating any efforts for
a review while other proposals floated around to either have other
agencies, such as the Departments of Energy and State, analyze the
investment or to protract the time required for review from ninety to
141 days.1 29
Faced with this increasing mountain of procedural hurdles and
negative publicity, it is not surprising that CNOOC withdrew its
bid. 130 The Chinese government's response was one of
disappointment, and there were references to the politicization of the
entire matter by the U.S. government. 131 Despite the plausible
national security concerns raised in the proposed Unocal
acquisition,' 3 2 the derailment of the regular CFIUS process "feeds the
perception that Congress may obstruct viable transactions in an

125.
Cooke, supra note 123 ("[N]o one from Norton raised national security
concerns despite a lack of any evidence that a British company taking over implicated
any more national security concerns than a French company.").
126.
See Margaret L. Merrill, Overcoming CFIUS Jitters: A PracticalGuide for
Understanding the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 30
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 23-25 (2011).
127.
See Michael Petrusic, Oil and the National Security: CNOOC's Failed Bid
to Purchase Unocal, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (2006) ("CNOOC was not the first
company to make an offer for Unocal. Chevron, a privately-owned U.S. oil company,
made an offer worth $16.8 billion of cash and stock on April 4, 2005. On June 23, 2005,
CNOOC followed suit with an unsolicited, $18.5 billion all-cash bid for Unocal - almost
$2 billion more than the Chevron bid.").
128.
See id. ("The CNOOC bid promptly attracted attention in Washington not
because of its dollar amount, but because the Chinese government held a seventy
percent share in CNOOC.").
129.
Merrill, supra note 126, at 24-25 ("Congressional response was swift and
decisive.").
130.
See id. at 25 (remarking that for CNOOC, the congressional response had
proved to be the "final straw").
131.
See Petrusic, supra note 127, at 1388 ("The chief information officer of
Falcon Power, a Beijing-based energy consulting firm . . . state[ed] that '[t]he way the
U.S. government has treated CNOOC and politicized the deal will largely frustrate
Chinese companies."').
132.
Souvik Saha, CFIUS Now Made in China: Dueling National Security
Review Frameworks as a Countermeasure to Economic Espionage in the Age of
Globalization, 33 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 199, 221 (2012) (remarking that "[tihe
CNOOC-Unocal fiasco has justifiably served as the poster child for the purported lack
of transparency in the U.S. national security review process").
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13 3
Given that CNOOC withdrew
arbitrary and capricious manner."
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134
sector.
energy
the
in
was
acquisition
Shortly thereafter, another controversy broke out with the
proposed acquisition of a company that managed six U.S. ports,
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation (P&O), by Dubai Ports
World (DP World).1 35 DP World had notified CFIUS of the transaction
and, after a review by CFIUS, it was concluded that an investigation
was not necessary. 136 However, controversy erupted when an
Associate Press news story reported that the United Arab Emirates
had been home to several 9/11 terrorists while emphasizing that ports
37
exposed the United States to risk of attacks.1 Congress reacted
quickly with a flurry of proposed legislation, 138 and there was
movement to block the transaction. 139 Even though CFIUS had
cleared DP World at the review stage, DP World nevertheless
0
requested the CFIUS conduct a full investigation.14 Disheartened by
the continuing controversy, DP World later abandoned the
transaction and sold all its U.S. port operations.141
In 2007, the attempted acquisition of part of 3Com, a technology
company that supplied U.S. government agencies, by China-based
Huawei understandably raised national security concerns and was
42
quickly abandoned.1 The most recent case in the media involves the
from
Obama administration blocking Chinese-owned Ralls Corp
43
airspace.1
Navy
U.S.
near
acquiring wind-farm assets located

Id. at 223.
133.
See Matthew C. Sullivan, CFIUS and Congress Reconsidered: Fire Alarms,
134.
Police Patrols, and a New Oversight Regime, 17 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DisP. RESOL.
199, 221-22 (2009) ("[U]itimately, congressional pressure in this context might have
saved CFIUS and the Bush administration from approving a politically unpopular deal,
the blocking of which would nevertheless have been too inflammatory toward China").
See id. at 222-23.
135.
See Merrill, supra note 126, at 26.
136.
See id. (citing Ted Bridis, United Arab Emirates Firm May Oversee 6 U.S.
137.
Ports, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
2
article/2006/02/1I/AR20060 110112.html [http://perma.cc/EWZ9-HY2H] (archived Sept.
23, 2014)).
See Sullivan, supra note 134, at 223.
138.
See Merrill, supra note 126, at 27.
139.
See Sullivan, supra note 134, at 223 ("DP World took the unusual step of
140.
requesting in late February that CFIUS conduct a full investigation, notwithstanding
the prior determination that an extended review was unnecessary.").
See Merrill, supra note 126, at 28 ("After almost a month of controversy, DP
141.
World finally succumbed to the political pressure, announcing that it would sell its U.S.
operations to an American company."); see also id. at 27 (noting that President Bush
defended CFIUS's approval of the DP World deal).
See Cooke, supra 123, at 739.
142.
Wind Farm
See Sara Foden, Chinese-Owned Company Sues Obama over
143.
2
Project, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201 -10-02/obama-
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In Canada, proposed foreign investment has also attracted
attention. In 2004, Noranda Inc. was the acquisition target of China
MinMetals. Amidst concerns that Canada's resources were being
diverted and that there was a climate of suspicion, China MinMetal
abandoned the transaction. 44 However, in 2008, for the first time
ever, the Canadian government actually exercised its power to block a
proposed investment. Later, the acquisition of MacDonald Dettwiler
by Alliant Techsystems also raised national security concerns. 145
MacDonald Dettwiler operated a satellite that caused the Canadian
government to worry about the security of the satellite data. 146
Although there have been successful transactions involving foreign
investment in Canadian natural resources, including by Chinese
companies,1 47 in 2010 the Canadian government blocked an attempt
by BHP Billiton Ltd. to engage in a hostile takeover of the Potash
Corporation of Saskatchewan.14 8 The Canadian government has also
demonstrated that it has the tenacity to pursue foreign investors who
do not live up to their undertakings. In 2011, after pursuing U.S.
Steel for its failure to honor undertakings given in its acquisition of
Stelco, the Canadian government finally reached an out-of-court
settlement with new undertakings provided. 4 9

bars-chinese-owned-company-from-building-wind-farm.html
[http://perma.cc/B9EL.
9VGQ] (archived Sept. 23, 2014] (discussing a lawsuit filed by Ralls Corp. against both
President Obama and the CFIUS following a decision by the Committee to block a
Ralls Corp. project).
144.
See VanDerMeulen & Trebilcock, supra note 121, at 400 (discussing voiced
Canadian concerns and asserting that "[tihe political unpopularity of the deal
ultimately led China MinMetals to withdraw from negotiations.").
145.
See VanDuzer, supra note 8, at 260 ("Even though the firm would have
continued to operate under a Canadian licence and the Canadian government would
retain access to all data, Canadian parliamentarians, among others, worried that the
security of the remote sensing data could not be assured.").
146.
See VanDerMeulen & Trebilcock, supra note 121, at 407; see also A.
Edward Safarian, Sovereign Direct Investment, in SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT: CONCERNS

AND POLICY REACTIONS 445 (Karl P. Sauvant, Lisa E. Sachs & Wouter P.F. Schmit
Jongbloed eds., 2012) ("This was the first explicit rejection of an application under the
Investment Canada Act in its twenty-three year history.").
147.
See VanDuzer, supra note 8, at 253 (referring specifically to oil sand
acquisitions in 2010 by Sinopec, China Investment Corp., and PetroChina Co.).
148.
See Lawson A.W. Hunter & Susan M. Hutton, Foreign Investment Review

in Canada: Be Careful What You Wish For, 2011 BUS. L. TODAY 1, 1 (2011); see also
BHP's PotashCorp Bid Rejected for Now, CBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2010, 11:54 AM),

http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/bhp-s-potashcorp-bid-rejected-for-now- 1.868381
[http://perma.cc/A3DB-2Y5K] (archived Oct. 1, 2014).

149.
See Media Room: Industry Minister Paradis Reaches an Out-of-Court
Settlement in the U.S. Steel Litigation, INDUSTRY CANADA (Dec. 12, 2011),

http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/064.nsf/eng/07011.html [http://perma.cc/KC8L-5WW9] (archived
Sept. 23, 2014).

2014/

FDI IN THE UNITED STA TES AND CANADA

1285

B. The BalancingAct-CautionaryNote
Foreign investment review presents legislators with an
extremely difficult task. While many laws require the balancing of
interests, the problem here is that national security represents a
priority of the highest order that must be balanced against the desire
to attract FDI, an increasingly important topic for Canada, which
50
now ranks poorly in terms of its ability to attract FDI.1 Overall, the
two opposing objectives can be categorized as political (national
5
security) versus economic (promotion of FDI).1
The analysis should not just be restricted to inward FDI. In
addition to attracting foreign capital, countries like the United States
are also interested in establishing operations abroad. Having an
overly opaque and highly politicized foreign investment review
system could possibly invite a response in kind from countries such as
China. Since 1979, China has increasingly opened its foreign
investment market to the world.1 52 However, with the passage of
time, it was inevitable that China would start to develop its own
regime to control the inward flow of foreign investment. For example,
in 2007, foreign investment in China became regulated by the newly
5 3 In addition,
enacted Chinese mergers and acquisition regulations.
China has also developed its own relatively new national security
regime. 154 This means that foreign investors now have "three
hurdles" to overcome when investing in China: the Chinese national

150.

See Matt Krzepkowski & Jack Mintz, Canada'sForeign Direct Investment

Challenge: Reducing Barriersand Ensuring a Level Playing Field in Face of Sovereign
Wealth Funds and State-Owned Enterprises, 3 UNIV. CALGARY SCH. PUB. POL'Y SPP
RES. PAPERS, no. 3, Oct. 2010, at 1-2, available at 2http://www.policyschool
.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/mattkrzepkowski-online .pdf [http://perma.cc/
798V.YA93] (archived Sept. 23, 2014) (discussing several metrics indicating Canada's
poor standing globally as a receiver of FDI).

151.

See Benjamin J. Cohen, Sovereign Wealth Funds and National Security:

The Great Tradeoff, 85 INT'L AFF. 713, 713 (2009) ("At issue are two competing goals.
One is economic: the desire to promote material prosperity by safeguarding
opportunities for productive international investment. The other is political: the right
and responsibility of every government to defend the nation's security.").
See, e.g., Suqi Qin, Transition and Incentives in China's Foreign Investment
152.
Regime, KOREA UNIV. L. REV. 135, 135 (2011) (discussing the history of China's gradual
opening up of its FDI).
See Jordan Brandt, Comparing Foreign Investment in China, Post-WTO
153.
Accession, with Foreign Investment in the United States, Post-9/11, 16 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 285, 334 (2007) ("The introduction of China's anti-monopoly provisions and
MOFCOM's discretionary powers along with the inclusion of the share-swapping
regulations will heavily affect the flow of foreign investment into China in the near
future."); see also ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 149-50 (discussing China's merger
review process).
See Tracy Wut & Chunfai Lui, Jumping Three Hurdles, 30 INTL FIN. L.
154.
REV. 70, 70 (2011) (discussing the inclusion in 2011 of a third hurdle, national security,
in approving foreign investor M&A deals in China).
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security regime, foreign investment approval, and an antitrust
review. 155 With respect to issues of transparency, in 2010, China
enacted its own state secrets law along with regulations that would
protect state secrets with respect to Chinese SOEs.156
In short, if Western nations are perceived as being overly
protectionist with their FDI review process, there now exist plenty of
legislative means for the Chinese to retaliate in kind. While one
might argue that an authoritarian Chinese government might have
retaliated without such legislation, the presence of such legislation
now means that any retaliation could be cloaked in the same disguise
as Western politics. This would make it difficult to criticize the
Chinese position without appearing hypocritical. Or, as Ian Bremmer
has noted, with respect to international trade, "[o]fficials in
Washington can't complain about 'Buy Chinese' provisions in
Beijing's spending plans until they remove the 'Buy American' clause
from their own."15 7 Ultimately, one of the goals of designing a foreign
investment review system is to promote its fairness so as to avoid
retaliatory actions by other nations.15 8
Returning to the topic of inward FDI and the task of balancing
political considerations of national security with economic
considerations of maintaining an attractive FDI environment, one
finds that economic considerations can bifurcate into another distinct
stream of considerations. The topic of economics can fall into a grey
area that seeks not only to attract valuable investment into the
country but also to protect the host country's economy from being
negatively affected by the actions of the investor. 159 In turn, this may
have precipitated the calls to have the CFIUS review include

155.
See id. at 70-71 ("[Iln the future, 'three huidles for foreign investors' M&As
in China' will have to be overcome: foreign investment approval, merger-control
clearance under the PRC Antimonopoly Law (AML), and now the approval for national
security under Circular 6.").
156.
See generally Sigrid Ursula Jernudd, China, State Secrets, and the Case of
Xue Feng: the Implication for International Trade, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 309, 316-22
(2011) (addressing China's new state secrets legislation and its impact on international
trade).
157.
IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET 191 (2010).
158.
See, e.g., George Stephanov Georgiev, The Reformed CFIUS Regulatory
Framework: Mediating Between Continued Openness to Foreign Investment and
National Security, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 125, 126 (2008) ("If the United States is seen as
using national security review to engage in protectionism, this could provoke a
protectionist backlash in other parts of the world and hurt U.S. companies.").
159.
See Paul Blyschak, State-Owned Enterprisesand InternationalInvestment
Treaties: When Are State-Owned Entities and Their Investments Protected, 6 J. INT'L L.
& INT'L REL. 1, 10 (2011) (highlighting the need to protect the host country's economy
from "undesired interference by foreign governments").
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"economic security" concerns. 160 While the government under
President Bush Jr. seems to have suggested that national security
16 1
there is also the perspective
reviews already take this into account,
that economic concerns are being invoked for protectionist motives
instead.162 From that point, it is not too far to move one step further
and advocate a broader, more overt consideration of net benefit to the
economy (as in the case of Canada) as was done by the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission in its 2012 Annual
Report.' 6 3
The invocation of economic tests, whether under the rubric of
"economic security" or more overtly stated as a "net benefit"
assessment, might serve to augment already negative perceptions by
foreign nations regarding foreign investment review. 164 This is
supplemented by the skeptical, but often deserved, observation that
foreign investment reviews can be highly politicized as the foregoing
discussion of past U.S. and Canadian acquisitions suggests. In the
United States, the entire review process can be tilted toward political
interests: not only do reports to Congress increase the possibility of
politicization,1 65 but the CFIUS itself is also composed of members
66
who are subject to political influences.1 Different members might
also have different priorities depending upon what they believe their
mandate to be. For example, there is the argument that national
security concerns might be subordinated to the pursuit of economic
goals because the CFIUS is chaired by the Department of the
Treasury.167
When the Canadian government blocked the acquisition of the
Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan by BHP Billiton Ltd., the
incumbent government was led by the Conservative Party. However,
this was a minority government that was vulnerable to losing power
if it could not muster support from at least some members of opposing

See Byrne, supra note 9, at 849 ("Similarly, inserting 'economic security' as
160.
a criterion for CFIUS review would take the focus off of national security and place it
on economic protectionism.").
See id. at 889.
161.
See id. at 849 ("Similarly, inserting 'economic security' as a criterion for
162.
CFIUS review would take the focus off of national security and place it on economic
protectionism.").
See generally U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM'N, supranote 10, at 1-2.
163.
FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 30, at 859 ("It is fair to comment that Exon164.
Florio is not well regarded abroad.").
Cf. Jonathan C. Stagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much
165.
CongressionalInvolvement Is Too Much?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 325, 352 (2007) ("FINSA's
most significant effect is to politicize the area of foreign investment due to its
dramatically increased congressional-reporting requirements.").
See VanDuzer, supra note 8, at 425-26.
166.
See Georgiev, supra note 158, at 129 (discussing criticisms of CFIUS).
167.
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parties.1 68 The opposition of Saskatchewan politicians to the proposed
transaction certainly would have provided the incumbent government
with the political incentive to block this proposed transaction.
Similarly, it has been suggested that the Norton Company case1 69 is
an example of how politics has infiltrated the foreign investment
review process in the United States. 7 0
The politicization of foreign investment review is not surprising
given the immense amount of money and numerous interests
involved. With no real definition of what constitutes "national
security," 171 the terrain is ripe for the exploitation of "popular
paranoia"172 by interest groups who seek to capture the regulatory
process for their own gain.' 7 3 Although difficult, there are at least two
methods of potentially bolstering the national security regime against
political capture. First, one might ensure that the government entity
charged with conducting national security reviews has dedicated
expertise in that area and is reasonably insulated from political
interference. 7 4 Second, attempting to circumscribe the boundaries of
the term "national security" by means of published guidelines1 75
could introduce a higher degree of accountability by providing the
general public with a metric by which to estimate the congruency of
the government's decision with established principles. In this regard,
one very promising model has been developed by Theodore Moran

168.
See Simone Collins, Recent Decisions Under the Investment CanadaAct: Is
Canada Changing Its Stance on Foreign Direct Investment?, 32 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
141, 161-62 (2011) (describing how the Conservative Party needed to have the
continued support of the Saskatchewan province, which disapproved of the acquisition
of Potash, in order to maintain control of the national government).
169.
See Cooke, supra note 123 (providing an overview of the Norton Company
case).
170.
See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 30, at 858 (referencing the Norton Company
case as an example of an option that takes into account "the political sensitivity of
foreign investment in the United States").
171.
In some respects, this parallels international trade disputes which have
similar national security exceptions. VanderMeulen and Trebilcock note that under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the interpretation of the term national
security has been contested and unclear. See VanderMeulen & Trebilcock, supra note
121, at 420-21.
172.
Cf. BREMMER, supra note 157 ("Just as U.S. policymakers can resist the
populist temptations of trade protectionism, they can also refuse to allow popular
paranoia to block valuable foreign investment in U.S. assets.").
173.
Cf. Merrill, supra note 126, at 4 (arguing that public choice theory might be
a possible perspective through which we might understand the CFIUS review process).
174.
See Safarian, supra note 146, at 448.
175.
Cf. Kristy Young, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States and the Foreign Investment and National Securities Act of 2007: A Delicate
Balancing Act That Needs Revision, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 43, 69 (2008)
("Preserving national security and encouraging foreign investment creates a difficult
balance to maintain. However, realization of market improvements to the current
CFIUS process could occur by creating a more exact definition of national security and
requiring increased transparency to the American public.").
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who has categorized national security risks into three broad threat
categories.
The first category (which I will refer to as "Threat ") consists of
proposed acquisitions that would make the home country dependent
upon a foreign-controlled supplier that might delay, deny, or place
conditions upon the provision of goods or services crucial to the
functioning of the home economy. The second category ("Threat II") is a
proposed acquisition that would transfer, to a foreign-controlled entity,
technology or other expertise that might be deployed by the entity or its
government in a manner harmful to the home country's national
interests. The third category ("Threat III") is a proposed acquisition
that would enable the insertion of some potential capability for
infiltration, surveillance, or sabotage into the provision of goods or
76
services crucial to the functioning of the home economy.1

This categorical methodology is consistent with the risk-focused
approach that this Article advocates later in Part IV.
The suggestion that the United States and Canada adopt
Moran's categorical guidance is not intended to hamper the very real
concern that foreign investments can involve national security risks.
Instead, the goal is to provide a reasoned approach to very important
risks while at the same time insulating the process from lobbyists
who may try to capture the process to pursue other goals.' 7 7 This
would particularly be so for Western democracies, such as the United
States, where lobbying groups wield considerable power. 178 One
recent study of lobbying found that the expected rate of return on
lobbying was a remarkable 220:1.179 This emphasizes the importance
of guarding against the exploitation of the ambiguity inherent in the
term "national security." It also gives reason to be concerned about
suggestions in the United States that advocate introducing additional
terms such as "economic security" or following the vague Canadian

THEODORE H. MORAN, CANADIAN COUNCIL OF CHIEF EXECUTIVES - CONSEIL
176.
CANADIEN DES CHEFS D'ENTREPRISE, CHINESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
CANADA: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY? 5-6 (2012), available at http://www.ceocouncil.cal

wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Chinese-Foreign-Direct-Investment-in-Canada-TheodoreH-Moran-March-2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/4245-PXVJ] (archived Sept. 23, 2014).
177.

See CHRISTOPHER BALDING, INTERSECTION OF MONEY AND POLITICS 89

(2012) ("If restrictions in international investment are to be justified by invoking
reasons of national security, then national security must mean something tangible
beyond any industry with politically connected lobbyists."). Not all lobbying is
necessarily to block an investment. Anderson argues that lobbying in the United States
has contributed to the acceptance of SWFs. See ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 136-38.
178.

See KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. McCoY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS 253

(2011) (recounting how in the aftermath of the subprime crisis in 2009, "commercial
banks paid over 50 million to lobbyists to beat back legislative reforms").
See Raquel Alexander, Stephen W. Mazza & Susan Scholz, Measuring
179.
Rates of Return on Lobbying Expenditures: An Empirical Cast Study of Tax Breaks for
Multinational Corporations, 25 J.L. & POL. 401, 443 (2009) ("In our case study,
corporations that lobbied received the lion's share of the available benefits and those
corporations were concentrated within a fairly small group of industries.").
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approach of "net benefit." While this Article has suggested that
national security reviews are indispensable, but could be augmented
with better guidelines and monitoring agencies, the next part will
critique the efficacy of using net benefit reviews to single out SOEs.
IV. NET BENEFIT AND SOES-COLLAPSING DISTINCTIONS
This section commences with a review of the Canadian net
benefit assessment process and the Canadian SOE Guidelines. It
argues that those guidelines depend on a classic neoliberal conception
of private and public demarcations of the economy. The claim
advanced is that Canadian SOE Guidelines depend on two
assumptions, both of which are incoherent. It then examines each
assumption and provides evidence of the incoherency.
A. Net Benefit, SOEs, and Neoliberalism
The net benefit assessment provisions of the Investment Canada
Act have the good intention of allowing only foreign investments that
ultimately further the well-being of its citizens. State-owned
enterprises are scrutinized in particular because they are "susceptible
to state influence" 180 and need to demonstrate commitment to
"commercial operations" 181 and "adherence to free market
principles." 182 Implicitly, the net benefit assessment must mean
something beyond national security because those concerns are
directly addressed in a separate part of the legislation. Under the net
benefit provisions, any foreign investment exceeding the monetary
thresholds is potentially subject to a net benefit review. But Canada,
like the United States, already has provisions in its competition
law1 83 that review large proposed mergers or acquisitions. Therefore,
there must be something particular about foreign acquisitions that
provokes the extra attention under the Investment Canada Act.
The suspicion that foreigners would be acting in ways that harm
Canadians should be dealt with under the national security
provisions. So, what is the purpose of the net benefit provisions?
Language in the Canadian SOE Guidelines suggests that while the
analysis is about economic effects, there is no mention of national
security. For example, the Canadian SOE Guidelines state that "the
180.
Canadian SOE Guidelines, supra note 15.
181.
Id.
Id.
182.
183.
See Competition Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-34 (Can.) (regulating large proposed
mergers or acquisitions); see also Canadian Competition Bureau, Merger Review
Process Guidelines (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.competitionbureau.g.caleic/site/cbbc.nsfleng/03423.html [http://perma.cc/37NB-MM57] (archived Sept. 24, 2014).
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Minister will assess the effect of the investment on the level and
nature of economic activity in Canada, including the effect on
employment, production and capital levels in Canada." 184 In addition,
they also state that the Minister will assess whether or not the
business acquired by the SOE will "likely operate on a commercial
basis."18 5
The language above suggests that the concern is that stateowned enterprises engage in noncommercial activities. If that is the
case, then the important question is why would one subject foreign
private enterprises to net benefit assessments. Prime Minister
Harper's comments on the matter are vague. In his official statement,
he discussed the net benefit assessment but focused particularly on
86
foreign state owned enterprises only.1
In particular, he indicated that in the future "the Minister will
find the acquisition of control of the Canadian oil-sands business by
foreign state-owned enterprises to be of net benefit only in an
exceptional circumstance." 187 This implies that the acquisition by a
foreign, private company may be acceptable. Yet, the net benefit
assessments apply to both private and public foreign entities. Even if
one accepts the concern that foreign SOEs are noncommercial and
potentially harmful to the Canadian economy, this does not explain
why foreign private entities should be subjected to net benefit
assessments. One scholar, Ian Lee, has opined that the Prime
Minister is indicating that there is a "two tier system" 188 that
scrutinizes foreign SOEs but will be more accepting of private, foreign
entities. Lee suggests that, with respect to FDI review scrutiny, the
Prime Minister is really stating "between the lines that we are not

184.
185.

Canadian SOE Guidelines, supra note 15.
Id. It also states that the assessment will include, with respect to the SOE:

[W]here to export; where to process; the participation of Canadians in its
operations in Canada and elsewhere; the impact of the investment on
productivity and industrial efficiency in Canada; the support of ongoing
innovation, research and development in Canada; and the appropriate level of
capital expenditures to maintain the Canadian business in a globally
competitive position. Id.
See Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Statement of the Prime Minister of
186.
Canada on Foreign Investment, PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA (Dec. 7, 2012),
http://www.pm.gc.caleng/news/2012/12/07/statement-prime-minister-canada-foreigninvestment [http://perma.cclUN2A-GFDL] (archived Sept. 23, 2014) ("And, Canadians
expect that we shall approve foreign investments that are of net benefit to
Canada.").
187.
Id.
Diana Mehta, Foreign Investment Doesn't Need Absolute Clarity: Harper,
188.
TORONTO STAR (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.thestar.comlbusiness/2013/11/08/foreign
[http://perma.cc/AV7U-SDDT]
investmentdoesntneed_absoluteclarityjharper.html
(archived Sept. 23, 2014) (quoting Ian Lee of Carleton University's Sprott School of
Business).
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going to do that to private for-profit companies coming from an OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]
country."1 89 This suggests that the current net benefit assessment is
directed primarily toward foreign SOEs but is drafted broadly to
include a range of discretion for the Prime Minister's office.
An analysis of the Canadian SOE Guidelines reveals that it
depends upon a classical, neoliberal perspective. Neoliberalism is a
philosophical perspective that views the world as a dichotomy of
private (individuals) versus public (government).19 0 It posits that
individuals transacting in a free market characterized by private
property rights ultimately advance collective best interests. 19' It also
contemplates that the role of government is minimized to the
essential role of creating, but not interfering in, markets. 192
Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang characterizes free market
fundamentalism as a myth and presents the myth as stating:
"Markets need to be free. When the government interferes to dictate
what market participants can or cannot do, resources cannot flow to
their most efficient use."193 He then asserts that there is no such
thing as a truly free market-its parameters are always
circumscribed by politics.1 94
The neoliberal vision of private individuals transacting in a free
market (supported to a minimal extent by a public government)
assumes a clear demarcation between public and private spheres in
the economy. Yet, the fragile construction of this assumption was
demonstrated by American Legal Realists in the early twentieth
century.s9 5 Their work challenged the dominant laissez-faire idealism
of the time, which held that a private market should be free from the
intrusion of government measures such as welfare-based
legislation.196 Morris Cohen astutely observed that what one might
view as a private property right was actually a delegated power from

189.
Id.
190.
Cf. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005).
191.
Cf. id. ('Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.").
192.
See id.
193.
HA-JOON CHANG, 23 THINGS THEY DON'T TELL You ABOUT CAPITALISM 1
(2010).
194.
See id. ('The free market doesn't exist. Every market has some rules and
boundaries that restrict freedom of choice.").
195.
See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 26, at 99 ("These doctrinal
developments were driven or reinforced by a host of loosely related attitudes and
assumptions-many of them outgrowths of the ideology of classical liberalism.").
196.
Cf. id. (providing a brief overview of the arguments against laissez-faire
idealism).
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the sovereign (i.e., the government). 197 He was absolutely correct.
Property rights derive their power from the fact that individuals can
call upon the government to enforce them. In so doing, he had
elegantly restated "almost a generation of American and legal
thought." 9 8
Cohen's keen insight continues to have application today,
ranging from analysis of the subprime mortgage crisis1 99 to this
Article's discussion regarding FDI. A FDI involves a foreigner
acquiring property rights in the host country. But Cohen's insight is
that property rights are a delegation of sovereign power. Therefore,
when a foreigner acquires property rights in the host country, in
reality the host sovereign is delegating a modicum of power to that
foreigner. The underlying tension inherent in this situation increases
if the foreigner also happens to be another sovereign state or one that
is controlled by the other sovereign state, such as in the case of
foreign SOEs.
Classical understandings of public/private spheres are
ambivalent to these power relations because, although the foreign
SOE is a government entity in its home jurisdiction, in the host
country's jurisdiction it is not "government." The foreign SOE simply
owns property; it has no power to legislate in the host country. It is
merely a "private" entity in the host country. However, when a
foreign SOE wields strong economic power and engages in a large
acquisition, public/private categorizations do not obscure the very
real sense that there is an exchange of power occurring. Backer
suggests that, in the past, governments feared that the growth of
private power might rival their own. 200 Moreover, he anticipates that
the new fear is foreign governments projecting their public power
through the "usurpation of private power."2 0
How does the host country constrain the power of the foreign
government in this case? One possibility would be to enact laws that
197.

Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927-

28).
198.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960
165 (1992).
See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Property Law and the Mortgage Crisis:
199.
LibertarianFantasies and Subprime Realities, 1 PROP. L. REV. 7, 8 (2011) ("Liberty is
not possible without regulation; paradoxically, the liberty we experience in the private
sphere is only possible because of the regulation we impose in the public sphere.
Indeed, it is fair to say that when we talk about liberty, we're talking about the
benefits of living within a just regulatory structure.").
200.
See Larry CatA Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global
Regulations of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises and the Chinese
Experience, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 19 (2010).
201.
See id. ("But, unlike the perceived danger confronting their ancestors, the
challenges today do not arise from the usurpation of public power by private
enterprises: instead it arises from the usurpation of private power by foreign public
actors that reach across borders.") (footnote omitted).
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curtail the power of all private entities. The other approach might be
to identify the foreign entity and prohibit investment altogether.
However, if the host country wants to continue to welcome foreign
investment, then the issue becomes more problematic. How is the
exercise of foreign, public power in a domestic, private market
curtailed? In the case of foreign SOEs, one might require that the
foreign SOE act like other "private actors." This assumes that one can
define this type of behavior meaningfully and prescribe it to the
foreign SOE, as Backer has observed in his analysis of SWFs. 202
The above approach resonates with an underlying tension.
Paradoxically, in order to preserve a neoliberal vision of a free market
where individuals conduct business free of meddlesome government
intervention, the government is now prescribing how private (foreign)
actors ought to behave. Notwithstanding this ideological dilemma,
the above approach is the one that is encapsulated within the
Canadian SOE Guidelines and is based on two assumptions. The first
assumption is that it is possible to identify foreign SOEs, and the
second is that it is possible to essentialize "free market" and
"commercial behavior." Below, this Article analyzes both of these
assumptions and finds them to be problematic.
B. Struggle #1: Identifying the Foreign State Interest
Comprehensively
Both SOEs and SWFs have raised concerns for host countries.
Although SWFs are not addressed in the Canadian SOE Guidelines,
from the point of view of the Canadian government, they might still
be subject to a net benefit assessment for two reasons. First, under
the Investment Canada Act, an SOE is broadly defined to include
even an entity that is indirectly influenced by a foreign
government." 20 3 Although SWFs and SOEs are different concepts, 204
the definition is arguably broad enough to capture SWFs as well.
Second, the net benefit assessment process is not simply restricted to
SOEs and thus may potentially apply to SWFs.
Is it possible to identify an SWF? Large SWFs, such as the China
Investment Corporation, are very prominent and identification is not
an issue. However, it is not simply the existence of SWFs that
concerns host countries. It is the perception that these SWFs may
exert their power through equity structures, such as voting shares
(i.e., their investments), in order to pursue politically motivated

202.
See Backer, Sovereign, supra note 22, at 445-46.
203.
Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28, § 3 (Can.).
204.
See Jongbloed, Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 64, at 3-10 (categorizing stateinfluenced FDI entities as being SWFs and SOEs and briefly explaining their
attributes).
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objectives. The problem is that there are at least two legal structures
that can obscure the exercise of power. First, corporations are
legislative creations that have a separate legal identity from their
shareholders. 205 Since corporations generally have the powers of a
206 they may transact in the
natural person to conduct business,
market as if they were real persons while masking the identity of
their shareholders. Second, individuals do not need to transact
personally. They may invest indirectly as in the case of hedge
funds 207 or private equity funds.20 8
The fusion of these two concepts is manifested in investment
structures such as private equity funds (which include hedge funds).
The identities of the investors of these funds are shielded when they
purchase equity because (a) they do not become the corporation that
they purchase, but rather are merely shareholders; and (b) they do
not hold the shares themselves but through the hedge or private
equity fund. 209 Also, under U.S. securities law, these funds are
21 0 and, under the
considered private and unregistered pools of capital
private exemption exception, are not required to disclose their
211
holdings.

See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 5-8 (2010) (discussing
205.
limited liability of corporate shareholders).
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. § 121(a) (2013) (allowing the corporation the
206.
"powers and privileges" that are "necessary or convenient to the conduct, promotion or
attainment of the business or purposes set forth in its certificate of incorporation.").
See generally DANIEL CAPOCCI, THE COMPLETE GUIDE To HEDGE FUNDS
207.
AND HEDGE FUND STRATEGIES 18-23 (2013) (describing hedge funds in the United
States and Canada).
See Steven E. Hurdle Jr., A Blow to Public Investing: Reforming the System
208.
of Private Equity Fund Disclosures, 53 UCLA L. REV. 239, 241-50 (2005) (discussing
the structure and regulation of private equity funds); see also ALAN R. PALMITER,
SECURITIES REGULATION 516-17 (5th ed. 2011) (describing private equity funds).
See Hurdle, supra note 208, at 242-44 (explaining the desire for privacy in
209.
private equity investments); see also CAPOCCI, supra note 207, at 18-20 (describing
hedge or private funds in the U.S. and Canada).
210.
See PALMITER, supra note 208, at 517 ("Private equity funds are private,
unregistered investment pools that typically acquire a 100 percent ownership interest
in mature companies that often were once publicly held and are 'taken private' by the
private equity fund.").
See Hurdle, supra note 208, at 245 (explaining how exemptions under the
211.
Securities Act of 1933 allow private equity funds to avoid disclosing information to the
public or securities regulations authorities). With respect to the two main exemptions
discussed, see Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2012)
(exempting the private fund if there are one hundred investors or less); 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-3(c)(7)(A) (exempting the private fund if it is owned exclusively by "qualified
purchasers '); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(i), (iv) (defining a "qualified purchaser" to
include a natural person with more than $5 million in investments or a
person/company who "owns and invests on a discretionary basis" $25 million or more in
investments); see also PALMITER, supra note 208, at 517 ("By limiting investment in
their funds, private funds are exempted form the definition of 'investment company,'
thus removing them from the heavy regulatory scheme applicable to mutual funds.").
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Yet, one of the key criticisms directed at SWFs is their purported
lack of transparency and, in part, this is one of the key aspects that
the Santiago Principles addresses. The lack of transparency with
SWFs is evidenced by the difficulty in collecting data on them. 21 2
Since private equity and hedge funds have traditionally operated in a
similarly opaque manner (i.e., no disclosure),2 18 this has led to the
observation that this represents the application of a protectionist
double standard. 2 14 For those who are concerned about the potential
national security risks that SWFs might pose, this poses an
extremely problematic situation. SWFs could invest in private equity,
which in turn could make acquisitions that do not trigger any form of
foreign investment review.2 15 This is because private equity funds did
not have to disclose their holdings in the past. The participation of
SWFs in private equity funds is no secret and is even acknowledged
in UNCTAD's 2013 Annual Report where it is stated that this makes
"public and private distinctions less clear cut."216 For those concerned
about this risk, recent developments that seek to empower
shareholders may have the consequence of correspondingly increasing
the power of SWFs equity holdings.2 17
However, under recent amendments to laws governing
investment advisors, private equity funds may have to disclose the
identity of clients if the regulatory authorities are assessing
"potential systemic risk."218 It is unclear whether monitoring funds
for the activities of SWFs would be considered within the ambit of
"systemic risk." This illustrates how "public" (SWFs) can become

212.
See Bahgat Gawdat, The USA's Policy on Sovereign Wealth Funds'
Investments, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 229-30 (Xu
Yi-chong & Gawdat Bahgat eds., 2010) (noting, with respect to SWFs, that they

"cannot be specifically identified because of data collection limitations and restraints
on revealing the identity of reporting persons and investors").
213.
See Hurdle, supra note 208, at 242-44 (discussing the high importance of
privacy of information to private equity funds).

214.
See, BALDING, supra note 177, at 91 ("Support for transparency promotes a
discriminatory and protectionist stance to require regulations above and beyond what
is required of similar investors.").
215.
See ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 160 (describing how the Service
Employees International Union brought attention to this issue in 2008); see also
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND PRIVATE
EQUITY: INCREASED ACCESS, DECREASED TRANSPARENCY (2008), available at
http://www.uni-europa.org/apps/iportal.nsfl3100172b0315al24cl25717d005dd9bb/

c3 72 d 96 ddb5f04a6cl257551003c2477/$FILE/SEIUSovereign%2OWealth%2OFunds%20
and%20Private%20Equity.pdf [http://perma.cc/A836-39HJ] (archived Oct. 9, 2014).

216.
UNCTAD, supra note 50, at 13.
217.
See George S. Everly III, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Shareholder
Democratization:A New Variable in the CFIUS BalancingAct, 25 MD. J. INT'L L. 374,
375 (2010) ("Examined alongside CFRUS regulations, this movement towards
increased shareholder rights and influence may exacerbate national security concerns
in situations where SWFs have gained a significant equity stake in a corporation.").

218.

See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-10(c) (2012).
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"private" (private equity funds/hedge funds) through the use of
standard legal structures. More importantly, a universal rule that
requires all private equity funds to disclose the identity of their
holders seems to be the only way of addressing this problem.
Is it difficult to identify a foreign SOE? It is easy to identify
large, powerful SOEs such as CNOOC. However, like the above
discussion regarding SWFs, the important point is not simply the
formal ownership of the foreign business entity. Instead, the concern
is that a foreign nation can project its power and preferences (e.g.,
pursuing noncommercial objectives) through its SOEs. But focusing
on equity structures does not capture the full picture. A foreign SOE
that proposes to do business in a host country is a more specific
version of a multinational enterprise (MNE). The OECD Guidelines
on Multinational Enterprises2 19 do not provide a precise definition of
"multinational enterprise" and states that "[t]hey usually comprise
companies or other entities established in more than one country and
so linked that they may coordinate their operations in various
ways."22 0 Thus, the definition transcends formal ownership structures
(i.e., equity) and is focused more on the relational activity between
various nodes. 22 1
This is important because it appreciates that coordination of
economic activity can occur outside of the traditional structure of a
corporation. In turn, MNEs can be powerful economic actors that
spread their interests across countries in a manner that best suits
them.222 This should not be surprising as the annual revenues of
some of the world's largest corporations exceed the gross domestic
product (GDP) of some developed nations (e.g., Walmart exceeding
Sweden). 2 23 The power wielded by MNEs goes beyond the intricate
sets of corporate subsidiaries that they might possess. Recently, it
has become more apparent that the complex sets of relationships
among various actors involved in the globalized provision of goods
and services has given rise to spheres of commercial influence that go

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
219.
available at
(2011),
17
ENTERPRISES
MULTINATIONAL
FOR
GUIDELINES

http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf
(archived Oct. 1, 2014).
Id.
220.
221.

[http://perma.cc/BG6P-FNC9?type=pdf]

See PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 6-7

(2d ed. 2007) (highlighting as decisive the ability to coordinate activities "between
enterprises in more than one country").
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, ROBERT HOWSE & ANTONIA ELIASON, THE
222.
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 441 (3d ed. 2005) (describing the issues of

foreign investment and the role of multinational corporations as "closely linked").
D. Hoornweg et al., The World's Top 100 Economies, WORLD BANK,
223.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTUWMI/Resources/WorldsToplOOEconomies.pdf
(last visited Oct. 1, 2014) [http://perma.cc/Z75E-XZAR] (archived Sept. 24, 2014).
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far beyond equity investments. These diverse economic ecosystems
are referred to as global value chains.
Beyond the traditional equity-based direct investment, there is a
growing prevalence of global value chains, within which production,
trade, and investment all take place. These global value chains reflect a
new phase in economic globalization in which multinational
corporations are engaging in an increasingly complex array of nonequity activities to build interdependent networks of operations. 2 2 4

Accordingly, the Obama administration has recognized that global
value chains represent the flow of critical goods to the United States
and has developed a strategy to ensure that this flow is secure.22 5
The importance of global value chains is reflected in the fact that
UNCTAD's 2013 Annual Report is subtitled "Global Value Chains."226
UNCTAD estimates that trade in goods and services from global
value chains is approximately $20 trillion (sixty percent of global
trade) but also notes that this is inflated due to double counting of
intermediaries. 227 However, even after accounting for the double
counting, the numbers are still impressively high. For example,
UNCTAD calculates that the $19 trillion of 2010 global exports
should be reduced by $5 trillion due to double-counting.22 8 Moreover,
UNCTAD estimates that approximately eighty percent of global trade
is attributable to transnational corporation coordinated global value
chains. 229 Even though global value chains are coordinated in
structures that transcend the equity structure of the traditional
corporation, they nevertheless represent an important projection of
power.
TNCs coordinate GVCs through complex webs of supplier relationships
and various governance modes, from direct ownership of foreign
affiliates to contractual relationships (in non-equity modes of
international production, or NEMs), to arm's-length dealings. These
governance modes and the resulting power structures in GVCs have a
significant bearing on the distribution of economic gains from trade in
GVCs and on their long-term development implications. 2 3 0

224.
JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32461, OUTSOURCING AND
INSOURCING JOBS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: EVIDENCE BASED ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
DATA 41 (2013), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32461.pdf [http://
perma.cc/UL29-XAAN] (archived Sept. 24, 2014).
225.
See id. at 43.
226.
UNCTAD, supra note 50.
227.
See id. at xxi ("GVCs lead to a significant amount of double counting in
trade, as intermediates are counted several times in world exports but should be
counted only once as 'value added in trade."').
228.
See id.
229.
See id. at x ("TNC-coordinated GVCs account for some 80 per cent of global
trade.").
230.
Id. at xxii.
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For purposes of this Article, these contemporary observations are
significant because they draw attention to a blind spot in foreign
investment reviews. Even though a commercial entity is not formally
controlled by a foreign government or SOE, it may nevertheless be
under the influence of one. This would be particularly so if the
commercial entity is located in the foreign country and has significant
assets or business interests there. For example, during its post-1979
reforms, China has gradually privatized many SOEs. These recently
privatized SOEs may nevertheless still have strong relationships
23 1
with, and be under the influence of, the Chinese government.
The Investment Canada Act and Canadian SOE Guidelines may
potentially capture this situation because the definition of "SOE" is
broadly defined to include indirect influence. While this theoretically
captures the importance of global value chains, it also results in a
definition that is so broad that it becomes difficult to envisage how it
would be implemented. The expansive definition of SOE means that a
Canadian-based corporation with significant business dealings in
China and agreements with the Chinese government could be
construed as a foreign SOE. In addition, as more U.S.- and Canadabased companies invest in China (i.e., outward FDI), they will face
China's own foreign investment regime. Like Canada, the Chinese
government has been known to approve foreign investment but
impose conditions upon the investor (similar to Canadian
232
One could certainly
undertakings or U.S. mitigation agreements).
government
Chinese
the
of
influence
the
under
being
as
consider this
SOE.
foreign
a
of
definition
the
within
falling
and, thus,
This does not suggest that we ought to dismiss the importance of
nonequity modes of influence. Countries like China may exert a
powerful influence on companies doing business within its borders.
This is not a stretch of the imagination when one considers China's
importance to many North American corporations. For example, it is
anticipated that in 2014, based upon sales and number of stores,
China will displace Canada as Starbuck's second largest market and
23 3
Rather, the
will play a prominent role in its Asia market strategy.

See Safarian, supra note 146, at 444 (stating that, with respect privatized
231.
Chinese SOEs and the Canadian Guidelines, "the guidelines fail to take into account
the numerous state-influenced firms, such as those firms recently privatized yet with
close ties to government, unless the term 'indirectly' is construed very broadly")
(footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Paula Gilardoni, Melanie Tan & Bridget Liedig, With Strings
232.
Attached - Lessons from MOFCOMS Most Recent Merger Decisions (May 16, 2013),
6 5
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1a f l18-676e-4eeb-96e4-a046ef1c5546
2014) (discussing the broad reach of
14,
Sept.
[http://perma.cc/R4B3-875D] (archived
China's merger control regime).

233.

See Vanessa Wong, Starbucks Gets Ready to Go from Tall to Venti in China,

BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK

(Nov. 1, 2013),

http://www.businessweek.com/articles/
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of private/public distinctions
that it lacks meaning. In a
professor Duncan Kennedy
of the blurring of public and

Success for a legal distinction has two facets. First, it must be possible
to make the distinction: people must feel that it is intuitively sensible
to divide something between its poles, and that the division will come
out pretty much the same way regardless of who is doing it. Second, the
distinction must make a difference: a distinction without a difference is
a failure even if it is possible for everyone to agree every time on how to
make it. Making a difference means that it seems plain that situations
should be treated differently depending on which category of the
distinction they fall into. 23 4

In the case of the Canadian SOE Guidelines, it is not clear whether
either of the two above criteria is fulfilled. First, the degree of foreign
government influence that is required to cause a business to be
categorized as an SOE is so vague that it is uncertain whether most
people would come to the same result. Second, if the concern is that a
business might act in noncommercial ways, does the identity of the
business really matter?23 5
The Canadian government recently stated that it does not intend
to provide any more clarification and that the government must
reserve some degree of discretion. 23 6 But when the meaning of "net
benefit" is so unclear and a detailed description of how the
government comes to these decisions is not provided, one wonders
what the point of having a purported rule is. From the perspective of
a skeptical public, it would seem that they are ad hoc decisions based
on whimsical politics of the day. Without any further clarification, we
are left with a nominal distinction that does not provide much
predictive value. As Duncan remarked, "The distinction is dead, but it
rules us from the grave." 23

2013-11-01/starbucks-gets-ready-to-go-from-tall-to-venti-in-china
5NW8] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
234.

Duncan Kennedy,

[http://perma.cc/TM9C-

The Stages of the Decline of the Public Private

Distinction,130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (1982).
235.
For similar reasoning with regard to SWFs and hedge funds, see Stiglitz,
supra note 34, at 30 ("Why should there be differing standards of transparency in
SWFs from, say, hedge funds? Why should we feel more comfortable about an SWF
that invests through a nontransparent hedge fund than one that invests directly?").
236.
See Mehta, supra note 188 (noting the Canadian Prime Minister's comment
that it would be "foolish for the Canadian government to provide absolute clarity"

regarding the country's investment guidelines).
237. Kennedy, supra note 234, at 1353.
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C. Struggle #2: Defining Commercial Behavior Meaningfully
The requirement that SOEs act in a "commercial" manner and
"adhere to free market principles," as indicated in the Canadian SOE
Guidelines, appears to be prompted by the concern that SOEs may
act in political or socially motivated ways. Yet, it is not clear how one
would define "commercial" or "free market" behavior. If political and
socially motivated behaviors are removed, then it appears this is a
reference to a desire that the SOE operate with an exclusive view
toward profit-maximization. Distinguishing SOEs from other
business entities on this basis suggests that "private" market actors
do not act in political or socially motivated ways. An examination of
contemporary realities reveals that this is not true.
Since SWFs are owned by governments, they may be potentially
reviewed on either national security grounds or even attract net
benefit review given the expansive definition of SOEs under the
Canadian SOE Guidelines. The approach to SWFs is try to guide
them toward "private" behavior despite their public ownership
nature.23 8 For example, the Santiago Principles state that an SWF's
operational management with respect to third parties should be on
"economic and financial grounds;"23 9 financial information should be
disclosed to demonstrate the SWF's economic and financial
orientation; 240 and, moreover, the SWF is to behave in a way that
"aim[s] to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns . . . ."241
Thus, despite their affiliation with a government entity, SWFs
are expected to mimic the behavior of private actors in free marketsa behavior that is "substantially non-political"2 42 and with a view to
"maximization of financial advantage." 243 This is supposed to reflect a
description of an "idealized private investor." But this line of thinking
is outdated and does not accurately reflect contemporary realities.
While it might be argued that many private actors might act in this
idealized manner, there are enough notable exceptions to make
distinguishing SWFs on political/social behavior grounds suspect.
The Equator Principles represent a voluntary set of principles
that promote socially and environmentally responsible investment,
particularly regarding project finance in emerging markets. It has
seventy-nine current members who span more than thirty-five

See Larry CatA Backer, The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund: Between
238.
Private and Public, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1271, 1272 (2009) [hereinafter Backer,
Norweigian] (describing the current "formally public/functionally private" model of
regulation).
SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supranote 17 (referring to GAPP Principle 14).
239.
See id. (referring to GAPP Principle 17).
240.
Id. (referring to GAPP Principle 19).
241.
Backer, Norwegian, supra note 238.
242.
243.
Id.
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countries, 244 and include well-known U.S. financial institutions such
as Bank of American Corporation, Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase
and Co., and Wells Fargo Bank. 24 5 Well-known Canadian financial
institutions include Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Royal
Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, and TD
Financial Group. 246 Every member commits to upholding the
principles that include not only environmental and social
assessment/standards but also grievance mechanisms, independent
review, monitoring and reporting, and transparency requirements.247
What is particularly interesting is that the membership includes not
only the leading financial institutions above, but it also includes
government-affiliated entities that promote international trade such
as the Export-Import Bank of the Americas and Export Development
Canada.248 This suggests that noncommercial, environmental/socially
conscious norms can be shared between both private and public
entities, with private entities also serving as an important vehicle for
the proliferation of these norms. 249
In addition, beyond the large financial institutions that have
adopted the Equator Principles, there is a significant growing group
of influential private investors who advocate socially responsible
investing that blends concern for social and environmental issues
while also generating a financial return for the investors. One leading
nonprofit organization that unifies these types of private investors is
the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN). GIIN's members are
expected to have "a demonstrated commitment to, and experience
making, investments for social and environmental impact."25 0 Some
of GIIN's members include J.P. Morgan, Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank, Goldman Sachs Urban Investment Group as well as the World

244.
See
About
the
Equator
Principles,
EQUATOR
PRINCIPLES,
http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about-ep/about-ep [http://perma.cc/F2VN4MVK] (archived Sept. 12, 2014).
245.
See Members & Reporting, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equatorprinciples.comlindex.php/members-reporting/members-and-reporting
[http://perma.cc/
SM6G-74EB] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
246.
See id.
247.
See The Equator Principles June 2013, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, at 1, 8-10,
http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator-principles III.pdf (last visited
Jan. 11, 2014) [http://perma.cc/DLT3-EBYL ] (archived Sept. 24, 2014).
248.
See Members & Reporting,supra note 245.
249.
Ariel Meyerstein, Transnational Private Financial Regulation and
Sustainable Development: An Empirical Assessment of the Equator Principles, 45
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 487, 577 (2013) ("By providing platforms for the
dissemination of the ideas and organizational practices that undergird the
sustainability agenda, they help create the social linkages and governance structures
among competitor institutions necessary for norm diffusion.").
250.
Membership Criteria, GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, http://wvw
.thegiin.org/cgi-binliowa/councillmember-process/index.html
[http://perma.cc/ND5L-Y5ZJ]
(archived Sept. 14, 2014).
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251
J.P. Morgan
Bank affiliated International Finance Corporation.
conducted a survey of GIIN members in early 2013 that revealed the
financial significance of the organization. The expected commitment
to impact investing for the year 2013 from respondents was $9
billion. 252
Similar to the discussion above of investment bodies,
corporations are not solely defined in terms of profit maximization by
all members of the business community. The growing movement
toward corporate social responsibility 253 evidences the contemporary
outlook that it is legitimate and accepted that corporations need not
pursue solely monetary gain but can also balance noncommercial
objectives in their missions. In the landmark Canadian Supreme
Court case of BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debenture Holders, the Court held
that directors owed a duty to advance the best interests of the
corporation but that the best interest of the corporation was not
only. 254 The
shareholders
with
synonymous
necessarily
acknowledgement that directors may have a duty to consider broader
stakeholder interests implies that profit maximization is no longer an
exclusive objective of the corporation. In the United States, the
general theme of the BCE case had already been codified into law by
many states. These states enacted "constituency statutes" that
specifically permit directors of corporations to consider broader
25 5
In the United
stakeholder interests beyond those of shareholders.
Kingdom, the 2006 Company Law not only makes it permissible for
directors to consider nonshareholder interests but actually requires

251.

See

GIIN

Members,

GLOBAL

IMPACT

INVESTING

NETWORK,

http://www.thegiin.org/cgi-bin/iowalnetwork/members/index.html [http://perma.cc/Q2QTPV3H] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
See J.P. Morgan, Survey Shows Market Growth in Impact Investments and
252.
Satisfaction Among Investors (Jan. 7, 2013), https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename
=JPM_redesign/JPM.ContenLC/GenericDetailPage Template&cid=1320509594546&c-JP
M_ContentC [http://perma.cc/5DDW-7XNW] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (reporting a
USD 1 billion increase from 2012).
Andrew Crane et al., The Corporate Social Responsibility Agenda, in THE
253.
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 3 (Andrew Crane et al.
eds., 2008) (referring to CSR's "phenomenal rise to prominence in the 1990s and
2000s").
See BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, 565 (Can.). See
254.
generally Ed Waitzer & Johnny Jaswal, Peoples, BCE, and the Good Corporate
"Citizen'" 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 439 (2009) (discussing the potential impact on
directors of the BCE case's articulation of broad director duties).
See generally Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate
255.
Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992) (discussing the interpretation
of constituency statutes); see also Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can
Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible CorporationsStuck in Revlon Land?,
42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 767 (2009) (discussing the application of constituency statutes
to corporate decision making).
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that they consider -interests such as employees and the broader
community. 256
The legitimacy of blending entrepreneurial profit motive with
social mission has received statutory recognition in the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom. There is a growing movement
toward social enterprise globally. 257 Social entrepreneurs are
concerned with using traditional entrepreneurship techniques but are
primarily driven to advance social causes such as protecting the
environment, creating jobs, and providing health care. 258 In the
United States, there are a growing number of states that have
enacted "benefit corporation" legislation that requires that the
corporation pursue general benefits for the community 259 and,
optionally, specific benefits of its own choosing. 260 Directors of these
corporations are specifically required to consider the pursuit of these
benefits in their managerial decision-making process. 26 1 The benefit
corporation is also required to provide an annual report describing
how it has attempted to advance its declared social mission. 262
Benefit corporations that wish to further demonstrate their
commitment to social mission advancement can apply for third-party
certification by organizations such as B-Lab. 26 3 B-Lab is a nonprofit

256.
See Companies Act, c. 46, § 172 (2006) (U.K.).
257.
See Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in CorporateLaw:
A Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case
for the Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 714, 642-644 (2013) (noting
significant growth in the social enterprise sector despite the global recession); see also
Jacques Defourny & Marthe Nyssens, Conceptions of Social Enterprise and Social
Entrepreneurshipin Europe and the United States: Convergences and Divergences, 1 J.
Soc. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 32, 35-37 (2010) (explaining how the Nordic, U.K., and
Southern countries have moved toward social enterprise); Jacques Defourny & ShinYang Kim, Emerging Models of Social Enterprise in Eastern Asia: A Cross-Country
Analysis, 7 Soc. ENTERPRISE J. 86, 87 (2011) (analyzing "historical and current socioeconomic contexts . . . as well as the key factors and driving forces . . . which led to the

emergence of social enterprise" in China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan).
258.
Cf. Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L.
REV. 59, 86 (2010) (discussing how a social enterprise "measures its success both in
terms of its financial performance . . . and its success in advancing a social mission or
addressing social concerns") (footnote omitted).
259.
See Janine S. Hiller, The Benefit Corporation and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 118 J. BUS. ETHICS 287, 291-92 (2013).
260.
See id. at 91.
261.
See id. at 293 ("If the independent standards are the heart of the BC, then
the duties of the directors and officers breath life into the entity, as they impose an
obligation to consider the benefit purpose in decision making.").
262.
See id. at 292.
263.
See id. at 290-91.
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organization that has a standard for social mission advancement and
will certify corporations that comply with that standard. 26 4
Since 2005, the United Kingdom has offered a specialized
corporate entity known as the "community interest company." 2 65
Community interest companies have to generate benefits for the
broader community and comply with their stated social mission. 2 66
Community interest companies provide assurance to the general
public that they remain committed to their social objectives because
the legislation prohibits any transfer of assets outside of the company
unless it is for fair value or to another social mission driven entity
(e.g., a charity). 267 The legislation also places a cap on dividends that
can be declared to shareholders thus further preserving funds within
the company so as to advance social objectives. 268 In 2013, the
Canadian provinces of British Columbia 269 and Nova Scotia 2 70 each
enacted legislation that created organizational forms resembling the
UK community interest company.
It should be noted that the U.S., UK, and Canadian social
enterprise legislation discussed above are distinct from other
organizations such as charities or nonprofit organizations. Although
charities and nonprofits are also social mission driven, they prohibit
distribution of profits to members or owners. In contrast, benefit
corporations and community interest companies are permitted to

264.
See id. (discussing BLab and the certification process); see also B-Lab, How
to Become a B Corp, http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-bcorp [http://perma.cc/6AZL-V7BA] (archived Sept. 13, 2014).
265.
Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, c. 27,
§ 26 (2004) (U.K.) (providing for the creation of community interest companies).
See id. § 35 (prescribing a "community interest test" for the social mission
266.
of the company).
See id. § 30(1) (restricting distribution of assets); see also Office of the
267.
Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Office of the Regulator of Community
Interest Companies: Information and Guidance Notes-Chapter 6: The Asset Lock,
DEP'T FOR BUS. & INNOVATION SKILLs (Mar. 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/211746/13-709-community-interest-companiesguidance-chapter-6-the-asset-lock.pdf (describing the application of asset locks to
community interest companies).
268.
See Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, c.
27, § 30(3) (2004) (U.K.) (allowing limitations on payments of interest); see also Office
of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Changes to the Dividend and
Interest Caps for Community Interest Companies: Response to the CIC consultation on
the dividend and interest caps, DEP'T FOR BUS. & INNOVATION SKILLs 6 (Dec. 10, 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/264664/
CIC-13-1333-community-interest-companies-response-on-the-cic-consultation.pdf
(summarizing the restrictions placed on the assets of community interest companies).
269.
See Business Corporations Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57, §§ 51.91-51.99 (Can.
B.C.) (providing for the creation and regulation of "community contribution
companies").
270.
See generally An Act Respecting Community Interest Companies, S.N.S.
2012, c. 38, § 1 (S. Nu.) (authorizing the Minister to make "regulations respecting the
designation and operation of community interest companies').
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distribute profits to their members or owners. They represent a
blending of social mission with profit-generating behavior.
The above discussion examples-(1) commitment of leading
financial institutions to the Equator Principles, (2) the growth of
social impact investing, (3) the recognition and legitimization of
nonprofit maximizing behavior in traditional corporations, and (4) the
legislation of entities such as benefit corporations and community
interest companies-are evidence of a single important point. SOEs
and SWFs are not the only entities that seek to advance
noncommercial objectives within an entrepreneurial framework.
Thus, to single out SOEs and SWFs on the basis of noncommercial
behavior is an insufficient distinction.
Earlier, this Article discussed the assertion that SOEs and SWFs
should be treated differently because they can act politically.
Politically motivated actions by state-owned entities should hardly be
surprising since governments have actively and transparently
pursued the interests of their home countries on the international
stage. 271 That SOEs and SWFs can and will act politically is
undoubtedly true. For example, China's outward FDI is intimately
tied to the Chinese government's broader vision of China's direction
and geopolitical position in the world. Its current push for FDI was
initiated in the early 2000s as part of its "Going Global" program,
which sought to encourage outward FDI. 272 The motivations for the
program are diverse and include not only the acquisition of natural
resources for China's immense population but also the increases in
efficiency that Chinese MNEs enjoyed over their solely domestic
counterparts. 27 3 This suggests that a one-dimensional view of statecontrolled entities is inaccurate. While it is true they pursue political
objectives, it is also true that they can be commercially oriented as
well-the two modes of behavior are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. 274
To suggest that SOEs and SWFs can be distinguished because
they act politically implies that private actors are apolitical. But the
existence of powerful lobbying interests, particularly those for

271.
See BALDING, supra note 177, at 90 ("[G]overnments have always lobbied or
coerced on behalf of their own companies and investments both domestically and
internationally.").
See XIAOFEi LI, CHINA'S OUTWARD
272.
PERSPECTIVE 12-13 (2010).

FOREIGN INVESTMENT: A POLITICAL

Id. ("To sum up, outward FDI can help companies realize various strategic
273.
objectives, such as market expansion, increase in efficiency and acquisition of natural
resources and strategic assets.").
See Michael Keller & Laura Vanoli, Chinese SWFs: At the Crossroad
274.
Between the Visible and the Invisible Hand, in CHINESE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS
97-101 (Ilan Alon, Marc Fetscherin & Phillippe Gugler eds., 2012) (explaining the
private and government strategies behind Chinese SWFs and the concerns that each
present).
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powerful industries such as the financial sector in the United States,
indicates that private actors do act politically. Moreover, they have
gone to battle for that right and emerged victorious in the United
States. The power of corporations to politically voice their interests
recently won an important victory in the case of Citizens United v.
FEC 275 where the U.S. Supreme Court struck down federal
legislation that prohibited corporations from directly spending money
to advance political views 276-leading to the worry that this could
have a negative impact on the U.S. electoral process. From the
perspective of this Article, this leads to at least two important
observations. First, the activities of powerful business lobby groups
erode the legitimacy of the distinction that SWFs and SOEs should be
treated differently due to their political activities. If political
activities should play a role in foreign investment review, and
perhaps some might argue that it should, then one must also account
for the political activities of powerful MNEs. Large non-state-owned
MNEs have tremendous monetary power-some with annual
revenues exceeding the GDP of some countries 2 7 7-and can deploy
that fiscal strength through the lobbying process, particularly in the
United States. Second, it is a reminder that powerful business lobby
groups can potentially seek to influence the outcomes of the foreign
review process itself.
In summary, the Canadian SOE Guidelines are based upon two
incomplete assumptions. First, they do not adequately identify the
full range of foreign power that they seek to address. Although large
SWFs are identifiable, the globalized and anonymous movement of
capital in equity structures, such as the corporation and private
equity funds, means there is a wide range of foreign investment that
remains unaccounted for under the present guidelines. Second,
although large SOEs such as CNOOC are identifiable, nonequity
modes of foreign influence dominate the global trade landscape to an
astonishing degree through global value chains as discussed in the
UNCTAD Annual Report 2013. Although Investment Canada Act and
Canadian SOE Guidelines theoretically account for these nonequity
modes of influence through the broad definition of what constitutes a
SOE, the definition is so vague that it hardly provides any

See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) ("No
275.
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or
for-profit corporations.").
See Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity:
276.
Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 643, 643
(2011) (noting the overwhelmingly negative response by academics to the Citizens
United ruling).
277.
See Hoornweg et al., supra note 223 (listing the world's top 100 economies,
including countries, cities, and companies, in descending order according to
GDP/Revenues).
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meaningful guidance. Given the opacity of the net benefit review
process, this results in limitless discretion for the government
without any substantive metrics by which the public might hold the
government accountable for its decision.
Second, the concern that SOEs and SWFs should be
distinguished from other investments because they may pursue
noncommercial objectives is also incoherent. Some of the largest and
most influential financial institutions have committed themselves to
incorporating environmental and socially responsible objectives
through the Equator Principles, thereby detracting from singular
profit maximization. Large groups of private investors seek to
advance socially responsible investing through influential networks
such as GIIN. The movement toward corporate social responsibility
indicates that pursuit of noncommercial objectives is not only
legitimate but actively promoted. This view received support recently
from the Canadian Supreme Court and is also evident in the number
of U.S. states that have enacted constituency statutes. Moreover, the
rise of social entrepreneurship demonstrates the social legitimacy of
business enterprises pursuing noncommercial objectives as a primary
goal. This has received legislative endorsement in the United States,
United Kingdom, and Canada through the enactment of corporate
structures such as benefit corporations and community interest
companies that specifically promote social entrepreneurship. The
suggestion that SOEs and SWFs should be singled out for their
pursuit of political objectives is flawed because private corporations
also act politically through lobby groups. Particularly in the United
States, corporate-financed lobby groups can directly influence
politicians and may potentially derail and capture the foreign
investment review process.
Despite its criticism of the Canadian SOE Guidelines, the
foregoing analysis suggests increased vigilance on the national
security front. The current foreign investment review process only
captures equity modes of influence such as when an identifiable
entity like an SOE seeks to acquire a domestic enterprise. It does not
account for the highly influential nonequity modes of investment that
occur through global value chains. This blind spot leaves both the
United States and Canada at risk that they may not sufficiently
control access to critical goods (a type I Threat under Moran's
categorical framework). 278 The Obama Administration's strategy for
securing critical resources in the global value chain is a good example
of proactive thinking that is not hampered by old distinctions.

278.
MORAN, supra note 176, at 5-6 (defining "Threat I" to consist of "proposed
acquisitions that would make the home country dependent upon a foreign-controlled
that might delay, deny, or place conditions upon the provisions of goods or services
crucial to the functioning of the home economy.").
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PROPOSITION OF HARM-BASED

REGULATION

In this part, it is argued that the Canadian net benefit
assessment should be replaced by a framework that (1) focuses on the
risk of harm to Canadians, (2) places primary reliance on assessment
by Competition Bureau experts and toward drafting laws of general
application, and (3) promotes greater transparency and accountability
through the dissemination of decision reasons. This part draws upon
recommendations made by Canada's own review process, which were
never adopted by the Canadian government, and draws comparisons
to the United States. It advances its claim for an approach that
focuses on harm, regardless of the identity of investor, by drawing
upon insights from the doctrine of damnum absque injuria.Using the
issue of subsidies as an example, it reinforces its claim that
distinctions between private/public and foreign/domestic are
becoming increasingly difficult to sustain, thereby justifying a
regulatory regime that focuses on aggregations of power (via
monetary thresholds) and harm.
A. Replace "Net Benefit" with a UniversalRegulation of Harm
Approach
In 2007, the Competition Policy Review Panel was created by the
Ministers of Finance and Industry and its mandate was to "examine
and report on the laws and policies that will underpin Canada's
continued economic growth and development."2 79 In its review, the
panel analyzed the Investment Canada Act and made several
recommendations. First, the panel agreed that the inclusion of a
distinct "national security" review was important and opined that the
CFIUS review process could serve as a model for Canada.28 0 Second,
the panel recommended that the "net benefit" test should be changed
to a standard that evaluates whether the investment is "contrary to
Canada's national interest."2 8 1 Furthermore, the panel also stated
that the burden of proof should be shifted to the government and that

279.
COMPETITION POLICY REVIEW PANEL - GROUPE D'PTUDE SUR LES POLITIQUES
EN MATIkRE DE CONCURRENCE, COMPETE TO WIN-FINAL REPORT v. (2008), available at

https://www.ic.gc.caleic/site/cprp-gepmc.nsf/vwapj/Compete-to_Win.pdf/$FILE/
Compete toWin.pdf [http://perma.ccl9UZE-V92T] (archived Oct. 1, 2014).
280.
See id. at 30-31 ("We respectfully suggest that the scope of this review
[national security] requirement should be aligned with that of the investment review
process used by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.").
281.
Id. at 32.
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this would be more consistent with "Canada's basic policy premise
that FDI generates positive benefits for the country."2 82
The panel noted that there were criticisms about the
administration of the Investment Canada Act and recommended that
the government should explain its reasons for blocking any
transaction in a publicly available report.283 The panel concluded
that, "[t]he current inability of ministers to articulate the reasons for
allowing or disallowing a foreign investment proposal does not meet
contemporary standards for transparency."2 8 4 It is important to also
remember that this recommendation was not with respect to national
security, which is a separate ground for review. In a national security
review, the implication of state secrets would justify a lower level of
transparency. The panel did however welcome the publication of the
Canadian SOE Guidelines as a step toward transparency. 2 85
With respect to the recommendations above, the Canadian
government implemented the separate national security review, but
it lacks many of the distinguishing features of the CFIUS review
process, such as an enumeration of relevant factors to be considered
and a reporting process. While the Canadian government did enact
the recommendation that the government publish a public annual
report on the administration of the Investment Canada Act, 286 as
noted earlier, the timely production of these annual reports for public
viewing has, to date, been lagging.28 7 The other two recommendations
were not followed. Canada has not substituted its net benefit
assessment with a "contrary to the national interest" test, nor has it
shifted the burden of proof to the government. The lack of
transparency, which caused the panel concern, persists as there is no
requirement for the Canadian government to provide any public
reasons for a blocked transaction.
The panel's recommendation that Canada focus on whether the
transaction is "contrary to Canada's national interest" is a step in the
right direction because it promotes transparency and accountability.
By placing the onus on the government to show that an investment is
contrary to the national interest, it forces the government to not only
articulate its reasoning but also to specifically address the harms

282.
Id. The panel also understood that this would tend to relax the restrictions
on inward FDI and acknowledged "that an investment that would not have been able to
meet the former net benefit test would be able to proceed without intervention from the
minister, unless it was a case where the minister's concern with regard to the factors
required to be considered under the ICA rose to the level of the national interest." Id.
283.
See id. at 33.
284.
Id.
285.
See id. at 31 (expressing the panel's belief that the new guidelines "will
improve transparency in the administration of the ICA").
286.
Id. at 33 (outlining recommendations for the annual report).
287.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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contemplated.2 8 8 In the United States, even under consideration of
national security, which typically requires elevated secrecy, the
legislation at least lists the potential factors the President should
consider.
The U.S. approach to national security can also provide further
guidance. The President's decision to block a transaction must be
based on a finding by the President that there exists a credible threat
to national security.2 8 9 However, in addition to that, the President
must also find that no other provisions of law "provide adequate and
appropriate authority for the President to protect the national
29 0
Correspondingly, a
security in the matter before the President."
specific harms
articulating
review
Canadian foreign investment
addressed by
be
cannot
harms
should publicly explain why those
exercise of
the
minimizes
This
existing laws of general application.
been
have
that
exist
already
rules
executive discretion when
extent
the
To
democratically.
enacted
scrutinized by Parliament and
that existing laws do not address the potential harm, there can be
public policy debate as to whether that harm is better addressed
through enactment of laws of general application rather than
isolating ad hoc transactions for specific undertakings.
It is also important to note that the term "harm" carries with it
the potential for over-inclusion of every potential negative societal
outcome. Even when one is acting simply to maximize one's own
interests, without necessarily any intended malevolence to others,
there is still the possibility that one causes harm to others. And, there
are circumstances where the legal system will not provide any
compensation for the victim of that harm. This is summarized in the
29
classic legal doctrine of damnum absque injuria. 1 Moreover, in the
realm of economic competition, not only does uncompensated harm
exist, but also it is actually encouraged.
Consider the problem of economic competition . . . this is an example of
a permissive law that allows the infliction of harm . . . . The market

place is predicated on the systematic infliction of harm by some actors
on others. Inefficient businesses are driven out of the marketplace by
their competitors. Workers are fired to make way for machinery.
Companies relocate, moving jobs along with them. Families are
scattered and uncertainty abounds. When one considers the reality of a
market system, it is evident that the legal system allows a great deal

See Hunter & Hutton, supra note 148, at 2 (restating the proposed
288.
amendments as a "net harm" test).
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1)-(d)(4)(A).
289.
Id. § 2170(d)(4).
290.
See Singer, supra note 35 (discussing the concept of damnum absque
291.
injuria).
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more damnum absque injuria than [liberal legal theorists such as]
292
Bentham or Mill would have us believe.

Therefore, an act that causes harm is not, in and of itself,
sufficient reason to prohibit it. The real question is whether society
will allow the harmful act to persist. Whether the harmful act is
permitted will depend closely on the advantages that society feels will
accrue from those acts. To what extent should economic competition
be allowed to inflict societal harm? The answer to this difficult
question is found scattered throughout legislation. For example,
minimum wage laws protect workers from economic exploitation. The
more comprehensive treatment of permissible economic competition
is found primarily in competition laws, such as the Competition Act
in Canada, 293 and through various antitrust statutes in the United
States. 294
This is relevant because an assessment of any foreign
investment is likely to come to a determination that the transaction
can result in some form of harm. However, whether it is "contrary to
the national interest" will require a more detailed assessment of
whether that harm is acceptable. This suggests that competition law
might provide the basis of an analytical approach to this issue given
its experience in delimiting the acceptable parameters of economic
competition. The next section explores this possibility and grounds its
analysis in the issue of government subsidies.
B. RegulatingRisk of Harm: Subsidies and Competition Law
Government subsidies are a controversial aspect of both
international trade and foreign investment. Generally speaking,
according to the WTO, subsidies refer to a government body providing
a financial contribution that confers a benefit. 295 Subsidies are
considered "specific" if they target a particular company, sector, or
region. 296 Assume Country A and Country B are both WTO members.
Also assume Country A subsidizes the manufacture of some of its
exports to Country B. If Country A's subsidized exports are causing
material injury to Country B's domestic industry, then under WTO

292.
Id. at 1013.
293.
Competition Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-34 (Can.).
294.
See CHRISTOPHER L. SAGERS, ANTITRUST 3 (2011) (attributing Antitrust law
to "three short provisions from two federal statutes: Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, and § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.").
295.
See Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Overview, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/scm-e/subs-e.htm (last visited Oct.
1, 2014) [http://perma.cc/J7C3-9KK4] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) [hereinafter WTO]
(providing the elements of the term "subsidy").
296.
See id. (stipulating that "[t]here are four types of 'specificity' within the
meaning of the SCM Agreement").
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2 97
rules, Country B may impose a tax or tariff on Country A's goods.
2 98 The
These taxes or tariffs are known as "countervailing duties."
rationale for countervailing duties is that subsidies distort
competition and are unfair;29 9 in essence, domestic manufacturers or
producers in the import country have to compete against exporters
who enjoy government support. The winner in the market should be
the producer who independently makes the best product, not the one
who has the most generous government.
However, an MNE located abroad does have a possible choice. If
an MNE wants to sell its products in Canada but does not want to
pay tariffs, it has the choice of "jumping the tariff barrier"30 0 by
attempting to establish a production facility in Canada.3 0 This could
involve an FDI transaction (e.g., taking over a Canadian company
with production facilities) but would not be subject to any review if it
did not raise national security concerns or reach the applicable
monetary threshold so as to trigger a net benefit review. This does
not necessarily mean establishing a local production facility will be
cheaper than having exported the goods from abroad and paying
custom tariffs. Setting up a local production facility can be an
expensive capital investment including financing, paying taxes and
license fees in Canada, and paying employees higher wages due to
stricter minimum wage laws.
Using the CNOOC acquisition of Nexen as an example, it is
evident that subsidies can become an issue in an FDI transaction.
China and its SOEs have been the subject of much criticism because
China has a long track record of providing heavy subsidies to its
SOEs, 3 02 thereby insulating them from the discipline of free market
competition. With respect to a FDI transaction, two issues arise
regarding subsidies. First, SOEs like CNOOC might benefit from
Chinese government subsidies to fund the acquisition in the foreign

See TREBILCOCK, HOWSE & ELIASON, supra note 222, at 276-86 (providing a
297.
general explanation of how subsidies are treated under the World Trade Organization);
cf. WTO, supra note 295 ("A Member may not impose a countervailing measure unless
it determines that there are subsidized imports, injury to a domestic industry, and a
causal link between the subsidized imports and the injury.").
FOLSOM ET AL., supranote 30, at 448.
298.
See id. at 447-48 ("Subsidies come in many forms, including, among others,
299.
tax reductions or rebates; tax credits, loan guarantees, subsidized financing, equity
infusions; and outright grants .... In theory, a countervailing duty offsets exactly the
unfair subsidy .... ).
MUCHLINSKI, supranote 221, at 39.
300.
See id. ("The foreign firm then has a choice between jumping the tariff
301.
barrier and setting up local production, whether through a licensee or a production
subsidiary, or not investing at all.").
See, e.g., Perverse Advantage, ECONOMIST (Apr. 27, 2013), http://
302.
www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576680-new-book-lays-out-scalechinas-industrial-subsidies-perverse-advantage [http://perma.cc/P24C-BBU6] (archived
Sept. 14, 2014) (discussing Chinese subsidies).
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country. In CNOOC's unsuccessful attempt to acquire Unocal in 2005,
the planned acquisition was substantially dependent on Chinese
government subsidization. 303 Given the large sums of money
available to the Chinese government, this could lead to an inflated
price for the acquisition. If this were to happen in Canada, the
domestic companies bidding for the acquisition would be unhappy,
but it is not clear why this would be harmful from a Canadian
perspective. Yuan Woo, CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation of
Canada states:
If CNOOC was a Canadian state-owned company, I would be unhappy
about my tax dollars subsidizing their perhaps too-rich offer to buy
Nexen. Chinese citizens may well be upset about the deal, but that is
for the Chinese government to worry about. If CNOOC is indeed paying
304
too much for Nexen, hooray for Nexen shareholders.

The second way subsidization arises as an issue in FDI involving
foreign SOEs has to do with fair competition. Since SOEs pursue
noncommercial goals and enjoy financial support from their home
government, they have the luxury of being able to survive without
necessarily being as efficient as private enterprises. Domestic
Canadian enterprises that do not enjoy support from the Canadian
government and have to compete against the foreign SOEs are at a
disadvantage. What if the foreign SOE continues to produce cheaper
goods, below cost, due to subsidization by the foreign government?
The domestic Canadian producers might not be able to compete and
will be driven out of business. However, that is not necessarily an
issue unique to FDI or SOEs. Abuse of dominant position and
anticompetitive pricing practices can be reviewed under Canadian
competition law30 5 and can be addressed under those rules. On the
other hand, if the foreign SOE continues to exist due to subsidization,
without necessarily seeking to be anticompetitive, then the
Competition Act may not necessarily apply because it is not "aimed at
preventing subsidies and artificially low prices." 306

303.
See Charlie Zhu & Umesh Desai, China's CNOOC May Tap Bond, Loan
Markets for Nexen Bid, GLOBE & MAIL (July 27, 2012, 6:23 AM),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-businesslinternational-business/asian-pacificbusiness/chinas-cnooc-may-tap-bond-loan-markets-for-nexen-bidlarticle4443823/
[http://
perma.cclN7YS-AVNE] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (noting that CNOOC's heavy reliance
on government subsidies drew substantial criticism from U.S. politicians).
304.
Yuen Pau Woo, CNOOC-Nexen: Does State Ownership Matter?, ASIA
PACIFIc FOUND. OF CAN., http://www.asiapacific.ca/editorials/presidents-view/37763
[http://perma.cc/6BLF-EUE5] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
305.
See Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, § 78(1)(i) (Can.) (stipulating that
"selling articles at a price lower than acquisition cost for the purpose of disciplining or
eliminating a competitor" is considered an anticompetitive act).
306.
Przemyslaw Kowalski, Max Bilge, Monika Sztajerowska & Matias Egeland,
"State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications," OECD Trade Policy
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This scenario raises an important question that goes back to the
damnum absque injuria discussion earlier. If a foreign government
wants to continue to fund its offshore SOE, despite the fact that it is
losing money, does the fact that it might potentially cause harm to
domestic competitors mean such actions should be prohibited? Not all
harms are necessarily prohibited. While the domestic producers
might be harmed, the foreign SOE continues to pay taxes, employ
local residents, and perhaps provide consumers with cheaper goods
and services. In other words, there is not enough information at first
glance to condemn the practice simply because it harms some
segments of the population, particularly when it benefits others.
In fact, in the Nexen acquisition, the Canadian government
insisted that CNOOC undertake to maintain levels of Canadian
employment at Nexen. But the Canadian SOE Guidelines also
emphasize that the Canadian government wants foreign SOEs to
operate in a commercial manner. What if the profit-maximizing,
commercial analysis requires layoff of workers? That would bring the
Canadian SOE Guidelines into conflict with the specific
undertakings. In fact, that undertaking has come back to "haunt
CNOOC." 307 CNOOC's return on Nexen assets is only 3.5 percent
compared to its overall average of 11 percent, and it was recently
reported that CNOOC is planning to lay-off workers and reduce its
30 8
operational expenses despite its pledge to maintain Canadian jobs.
If CNOOC receives subsidies to maintain its operations and honor its
commitments to Canada, would those subsidies be regarded as bad
for Canada? Conversely, if Nexen's decision to lay-off workers was
based on sound long-term, commercial sustainability planning, is that
not exactly the type of planning the Canadian government called for?
This latest controversy crystallizes, in concrete terms, the
contradiction in the Canadian position.
Even if we assume that foreign subsidies distort the Canadian
market and ought to be dissuaded, why should that analysis apply
only to foreign enterprises? If it could be shown that foreign subsidies
benefit domestic Canadian enterprises as well, then the approach
Papers, No. 147, at 7 (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en [http://perma.cc/
PJS2-ATEB] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
Nathan Vanderklippe, Nexen Deal Comes Back to Haunt CNOOC, GLOBE &
307.
MAIL (Dec. 3, 2013, 7:19 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/
international-businessasian-pacific-business/nexen-acquisition-hurting-cnoocs0
performance/articlel574286 / [http://perma.cc/7XGN-BHRJI (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
See id.; see also Claudia Cattaneo & Jeff Lewis, Nexen Letting Staff Go,
308.
Slashing Costs Despite CNOOC's Pledges to Ottawa to Win Takeover Approval:2 Sources,
FIN. PosT (June 27, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://business.financialpost.com/2014/06/ 7/nexencutting-jobs-slashing-costs-despite-enoocs-pledges-to-ottawa-to-win-takeover-approvalsources/?__sa=6flb-39a5 [http://perma.cc/A4T6-TFYY] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (noting
that CNOOC's "reshaping" of Nexen "raises questions about CNOOC's commitment to
conditions imposed by the federal government in exchange for approval of the
controversial deal").
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should be to scrutinize all enterprises, foreign and domestic, for this
practice. It would not just be restricted to foreign enterprises in a
foreign investment review.
An example can illustrate how foreign government subsidies can
benefit a domestic Canadian enterprise. This example involves
international trade of goods. In 2005, the Canadian Corn Producers
made a complaint to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal that
their competitors, U.S. corn growers, were being subsidized by the
U.S. government. 309 The tribunal ruled in favor of the U.S. corn
growers because the Canadian Corn Producers could not prove that
they had suffered any material injury. The Canadian Corn Producers
were undoubtedly unhappy with this ruling. What is fascinating is
who had joined forces with the U.S. Trade Representative to oppose
the Canadian Corn Producers complaint. The complaint was opposed
by many prominent Canadian businesses in the food processing
industry.310 The Canadian food processing industry used the lowerpriced U.S. corn as inputs into their own products and thereby
directly benefited from the U.S. subsidies. 311 Clearly, domestic
businesses can benefit from foreign subsidies targeted to foreign
businesses.
Although the above is an international trade case, its logic easily
applies in an FDI case. Assume that a Chinese SOE established a
business producing widgets in Canada. Those widgets are used by
domestic Canadian firms as inputs into their own products. If the
Chinese SOE is subsidized by the Chinese government (e.g.,
frequently receives cash infusions and low interest loans), it might be
able to produce cheaper widgets. Canadian widget manufacturers
would be upset, but the Canadian firms buying widgets as inputs
would be delighted. If one depends solely on a classic public/private
divide as an organizing paradigm, it might not be so clear that a
private/domestic enterprise could benefit from a foreign government's
subsidy to its own SOE. What matters is not the characterization of
public or private versus foreign or domestic. What matters is the

309.
See Canadian International Trade Tribunal, Dumping and Subsidizing
Order, Preliminary Injury Inquiry, No. PI-2005-001, Grain Corn (Nov. 2, 2005),
http://www.citt.gc.calen/dumping/preinq/determin/archivepi2f0l1e [http://perma.cc/9BW5JXBU] (archived Oct. 1, 2014).
310.
See id. The twenty-three parties opposing the application included many
Canadian associations, such as the Canadian Pork Council, Animal Nutrition
Association of Canada, Canadian Cattlemen's Association, Food Processors of Canada,
Brewers of Canada, Maple Leaf Foods Inc., and Canadian Snack Food Association. Id.
311.
See Grain Corn: Canadian International Trade Tribunal Inquiry No. NQ2005-001 (Apr. 18, 2006), http://www.fasken.com/canadian-international-trade-tribunalinquiry-no-nq-2005-001/ [http://perma.cc/9RJF-JUYL] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (quoting
Canadian lawyers for some of the parties opposing the application: "If the dumping and
countervailing duties had become permanent, it is likely that a number of Canadian
corn processors would have had to close down or move their operations to the US.").
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reconstituted economic and power relationships that the old
distinctions are no longer able to fully capture.
It is important to note that what constitutes a government
subsidy can go beyond a direct infusion of cash. It can include
financing assistance (e.g., guarantees) and preferential tax treatment
(e.g., tax credit, deferral advantages, and lower tax rates). 312 But it
does not end there. What constitutes a subsidy is often framed as an
unfair advantage that is provided by the foreign government to its
own firms in its country.3 13 The problem with this is that virtually
any government action can potentially confer a benefit on a firm. For
example, this can include government building a road that
particularly helps a firm or investing in infrastructure or providing
social benefits that a foreign government does not provide to its
people. 314 The amorphous nature of an allegation of an unfair
subsidization has "no natural limits to it."31
The concept of subsidies has been used to advance claims
relating to perceived lower standards in other countries. Weak labor
and environmental laws have been framed as hidden forms of
subsidies to industries in those nations with the weaker laws. 316 This
raises an interesting scenario relating to MNEs and global value
chains. Imagine an American corporation that is a leading producer
of electronics but offshores its labor to a country with weak
employment law standards (e.g., low or non-existent minimum wage).
It is arguable that this American corporation is now being subsidized
by the weaker standards in that country, all to the detriment of
American factory workers who could have had those jobs. Is this good
or bad? Leaving aside the significant concern about exploitation of
workers in another country, from an economics perspective it would
depend, at least in part, on whether the gains to the American
corporation were sufficiently distributed in the American economy so
as to offset the loss of jobs.
This Article is not arguing for or against the merits of subsidies.
The point is that the beneficiaries of foreign subsidies are not only
foreign enterprises but can also be domestic enterprises (as well as
domestic consumers). Old distinctions of foreign/domestic and
public/private are collapsing in a globalized economy increasingly
dependent on global value chains. To isolate only foreign SOEs in a
"net benefit" or "contrary to national interest" review on the basis
that they benefit from foreign government subsidies is an incomplete

312.
See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 30, at 448 (providing examples of various
forms of subsidies).
313.
See TREBILCOCK, HOWSE & ELIASON, supra note 222, at 284.
314.
See id.
Id.
315.
316.
See id. (positing various forms of "implicit subsidies").
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analysis. To the extent that subsidies are considered harmful, both
domestic and foreign entities need to be reviewed.
In the discussion above, the main issue is whether the economic
actors involved and the competition (or lack thereof) results in harm
and the extent to which society is willing to tolerate that harm in lieu
of the benefits that it provides. This suggests that this determination
should be carried out by a government agency with experience in
assessing the harms from mergers, pricing differences, and
coordinated exertions of power (e.g., abuse of dominance) such as the
Canadian Competition Bureau. In so doing, Canada would be
leveraging off already existing institutional competencies as well as
case law, decisions and notifications, interpretations, and experience
with negotiations and undertakings.31 7
The balancing of harm versus benefit might seem to be a return
to the net benefit test. It is not. Unlike the net benefit test, the
proposed reviews would be for all large transactions exceeding a
monetary threshold, regardless of whether the actors are foreign or
domestic. Also, unlike the net benefit review, the assessment would
focus on harm as an analytic strategy for compelling the government
to articulate precisely its concerns and compel the publication of its
reasons so that its decision might be assessed by the public. In other
words, the review would use a "contrary to the national interest"
standard but apply it to all transactions, domestic and foreign,
exceeding the monetary threshold.
If a transaction is blocked, then the Competition Bureau should
state why the matter could not have been addressed by current
existing laws, thereby prompting discussion upon whether general
legislation should be enacted. The Competition Bureau's forte is the
examination of issues through an economics-dominated perspective,
and there may be noneconomic values at stake, such as social
stability and equity. To the extent that the Competition Bureau's
decision is not inconsistent with other values that society feels ought
to prevail, the availability of its reasons and ability to have open,
democratic dialogue is vitally important to a legislative amendment
process that can address these concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Canadian net benefit review framework, including its
specialized treatment of SOEs (and potentially SWFs as well), relies
upon neoliberal distinctions between public/private spheres.
However, the realities of a globalized economy have rendered these

317.

Cf. Safarian, supra note 146.
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distinctions increasingly difficult to maintain and diminished their
relevance. At the same time, the potential politicization of foreign
investment reviews means that the ambiguity and fragmented
meanings embedded in outdated distinctions may leave the review
process vulnerable to capture by protectionist interests. With respect
to national security, both countries should provide more detailed
guidance of the risk-threats to be addressed. The existence of
influential nonequity modes of investment and the vast size of global
value chains call for an increased sense of vigilance because current
investment review frameworks focus on equity modes of investment.
The Canadian net benefit framework, with its reliance on
distinctions of public/private versus domestic/foreign, results in an
incomplete and inconsistent capture of the harms that it seeks to
address. It is, at best, a temporary patchwork solution. The globalized
free flow of capital and anonymized structures in corporations and
investment funds make it difficult to identify SWFs or other
projections of foreign power embedded in investments. The existence
of nonequity modes of investment also makes it difficult to detect
foreign influences beyond traditional corporations. Further, attempts
to discern and prescribe "commercial behavior" are misguided. The
global trend for both investments and corporations is to incorporate
noncommercial behavior, such as socially and environmentally
responsible concerns, into their missions. Concerns that SWFs and
SOEs act in politically motivated ways miss the mark because private
actors increasingly act politically and seek to influence legislators,
including possibly the foreign investment review process itself.
For these reasons, the Canadian net benefit framework should
be discarded in favor of a universal "risk of harm" regulatory
approach. This approach could take the form of a "contrary to
national interest" standard that places the onus of proof on the
government to articulate what harms it is addressing if it blocks a
transaction. The government should also publish the reasons for its
decisions while explaining why currently existing laws do not
adequately address the identified harms provoking the block. Using
subsidies as an example, the prior insights of this Article were
applied to demonstrate why the distinctions between foreign/domestic
and public/private failed to meaningfully distinguish between
perceived harms of subsidization. Accordingly, this Article submits
that the "contrary to national interest" review should assess all
transactions exceeding an applicable monetary threshold, regardless
of the national identity of investor or whether it is considered a public
or private entity.
As a practical matter, the Canadian government should leverage
upon the already existing institutional competencies of the Canadian
Competition Bureau's experience in dealing with similar matters.
Removing the decision from the hands of incumbent politicians and
vesting it in a government agency may serve to partially insulate it
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from partisan politics. Drawing upon the American Legal Realist
insight regarding damnum absque injuria, this Article argues that
society allows uncompensated harm to exist-the critical question
being which types of harms should be allowed in a market-based
society. Sensitive to the fact that this is a socially constructed norm
rather than a pure economics analysis, it has been suggested that the
Competition Bureau's traditionally economic-focused approach may
need to be balanced by transparent reporting and explanation. This
can provide the basis for informed dialogue about whether legislative
responses might be required to advance noneconomic values, such as
social stability and equality. Given the close legal traditions of
Canada and United States, the United States may wish to
correspondingly reassess the wisdom of adopting an "economic
security" test or Canadian-like net benefit framework.

